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COMMENT
THE INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE:
TOWARD AN EQUITABLE APPROACH
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination, or
conspiracy that restrains trade.' These interchangeable terms 2-contract, com-
bination, and conspiracy-all connote the general requirement that a plurality
of actors is needed to find a section 1 violatiori. On the other hand, section
2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize,
whether by unilateral or joint conduct.3 Thus, under the Sherman Act, a
unilateral restraint of trade is not, in itself, a substantive offense.
This seemingly clear distinction between sections 1 and 2 becomes blur-
red, however, by the complex web of modern corporate structures. Such
structures raise questions concerning the appropriate legal standard for defin-
ing a single entity within the meaning of section l's plurality requirement.
Present day corporate affiliation ranges from closely-knit, unincorporated
divisions to loosely-knit, incorporated subsidiaries." A holding company may
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
[Elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ...
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
Section 8 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part, "The word 'person' or 'persons'
wherever used in Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall be deemed to include corporations ....
15 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
2. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968)
(referring to contracts and combinations as "particular theories of conspiracy"). See generally
Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743, 744 n.5 (1950) (noting that
a desire to advance sensible distinctions has been abandoned); Note, Combinations in Restraint
of Trade: A New Approach to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 75, 76-77
(explaining that while the word contract carries its modem day meaning, attempts to construe
combination as separate from conspiracy remain fruitless).
The Supreme Court has defined conspiracy as "a combination of two or more persons by
concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose
not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means." Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1921).
3. Section 2 provides, "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony .. " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
4. Noting the variety of corporate affiliation, one scholar has commented:
[I]n a case in which one corporation owns a controlling stock interest in another
it has [not] by that fact alone made a single enterprise out of two different ones.
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govern a large conglomerate with myriad corporations selling different pro-
ducts in diverse markets. Conversely, a vertically integrated parent company
may strictly control its distributorship subsidiaries. Agreements between these
related firms can range from advertising arrangements to boycotts, or from
territorial restrictions to tying arrangements.' Should courts recognize these
variations of agreements and structure when applying the section 1 plurality
requirement?
The Supreme Court is now faced with this troublesome question.6 The
issue concerns what is known as the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. This
doctrine seeks to ascertain when affiliated corporations should be considered
distinct entities and, thus, have the capacity to conspire to restrain trade
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Providing no easy answer,
this doctrine has generated a plethora of academic discussion.7 Yet, as the
The controlling corporation has a choice. It can, if it chooses, elect to permit,
or perhaps require, its subsidiary to manage its own affairs, make its own deci-
sions, and operate as a separate enterprise, the parent retaining only an investor's
interest. Or it can integrate the operations of the subsidiary with its own, in whole
or in part, thereby bringing the two operations into a single enterprise entity. There
is no compulsion on it to adopt or refrain from either course; but the legal conse-
quences vary with the choice.
Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 357 (1947).
The use of the corporate subsidiary has grown enormously since 1900. See P. BLUMBERG,
LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS 463 (1983).
5. Tying arrangements exist when a firm agrees to sell a product or service contingent
upon the buyer's acceptance of another product or service, or upon the buyer's agreement
not to purchase the product or service from another supplier. Such arrangements are considered
per se illegal under the Sherman Act. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
6. On December 5, 1983, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983). The
Court had specifically asked the parties to address the proper legal standard for determining
when a parent corporation is capable of conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiary in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. The Court also invited the Solicitor General to present the views
of the United States. In addition, many business lobby groups, including the American Iron
and Steel Institute, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce,
and the Kaiser Aluminum Corporation, filed amicus curiae briefs urging repeal of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine. In support of the respondent, Independence Tube Corp., 31
states and the District of Columbia urged the Court to adopt a modified version of the doc-
trine which comports substantially with the standard suggested in this Comment.
7. Calling it a "weird concept," Professor Handler has been a principle advocate of repealing
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. See Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 415, 452 (1973); Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual
Antitrust Review, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 182 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Handler, Antitrust Look-
ing Glass]; Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine,
3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (1981); Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 10 THE
RECORD 332 (1955); Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking-Nineteenth An-
nual Review, 76 YALE L.J. 92 (1966); see also Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of
Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MONT. L. REV. 158, 199 (1962) (supporting a more limited
view of the doctrine that would evaluate the nature of the undertaking, but refusing to allow
corporations to "erect technical and artificial barriers in an effort to furnish immunity"); Kempf,
Bathtub Conspiracies: Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent Brew?, 24 Bus. LAW. 173 (1968)
(finding the doctrine unnecessary, while counseling that it may be disregarded unless coercion
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basis for a multitude of antitrust actions8 raising the often devastating poten-
tial for treble damage awards,9 this doctrine is clearly no mere academic
problem.
A literal reading of section 1 appears to prohibit every combination in
restraint of trade. Nonetheless, courts have recognized that a corporation
can act only through its employees. Thus, it is generally agreed that a cor-
poration cannot conspire with its directors,'" officers," or agents,' 2 unless
of outsiders is involved); McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises and Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183, 216 (1955) (asserting that there is "no place" in the
Sherman Act for the doctrine as it provides "no logical stopping point"); Rahl, Conspiracy
and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743, 767-68 (1950) (emphasizing the "senseless distinc-
tions" of the doctrine for the vertically integrated enterprise, while leaving open application
of it to the conglomerate enterprise until more economic data reflect the potential coercive
power of conglomerate affiliates); Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J. 5, 27 (1963) (likening a section 1 violation in the intra-enterprise
context to "condemning the bi-sexual oyster for incest"); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Conse-
quences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1968) (suggesting that section
1 liability attach only when subsidiaries publicly adopt a competitive posture or are used for
the specific purpose of achieving an anticompetitive result); Comment, All in the Family: When
Will Internal Discussion Be Labelled Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy?, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 63 (1975)
(summarizing academic discussion and concluding that the doctrine should be limited by ex-
empting enterprises owned and operated by a single individual, refusing to apply per se rules
in the related firm context, and applying section 1 to noncompeting affiliates only when form-
ed with the specific intent to restrain trade) [hereinafter cited as Comment, All in the Family];
Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372 (1954) (con-
cluding that the crucial question for liability is whether third-party trade was restrained; if
merely internal trade, then concerted activity should not violate section 1) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy]; Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1982) (recommending complete abrogation of the
doctrine because it is inconsistent with antitrust goals and because it encourages firms to select
less efficient and more centralized structures) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conspiring Entities];
Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard,
75 MIcH. L. REV. 717 (1977) (suggesting that the doctrine be limited to situations in which
the parent firm controls the day-to-day operations of its subsidiaries) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Suggested Standard].
8. More than 190 cases have, in one way or another, dealt with the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine. See Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. H., Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982) (compendium of decisions), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
9. Under § 4 of the Clayton Act, private litigants may receive damages in an amount
equal to three times actual damages for injuries caused by a violation of the antitrust laws.
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
10. See, e.g., United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d
174 (3d Cir. 1970) (although member of board of directors was held personally liable for con-
spiracy to fix prices with competitors in plumbing fixtures market, no conspiracy was found
between director and employer firm), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
11. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960) (president and sole shareholder
could not conspire with the president's corporation); Higbie v. Kopy-Kat, Inc., 391 F. Supp.
808 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (corporation could not conspire with its president); GAF Corp. v. Circle
Floor Co., 329 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (chairman of the board and major shareholders
are insufficient plurality to constitute conspiracy), aff'd, 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
12. For cases discussing types of agents that are unable to conspire with a corporation,
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such individuals perform the challenged acts for personal gain."3 Most courts
further agree that a corporation cannot conspire with its unincorporated
divisions," because such divisions are absorbed into the legal status of their
parent; stated differently, a corporation cannot conspire with itself.
Incorporated subsidiaries, however, whether wholly or partially owned,
enjoy a separate legal existence from their parent and other affiliated
corporations.' 5 As a result, incorporated subsidiaries are treated as distinct
see Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979) (general agents of insurance
company); Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 602 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.) (general
brokers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979); Miller v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 1979-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,593 (D. Minn. 1979) (manufacturing agent); Cory Food Serv., Inc.
v. United Vending Serv., Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,068 (D. Utah 1976) (former
employee of competitor); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1975)
(non-lessee service station operator), aff'd, 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923
(1977); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (common
employee of two corporations); Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 375 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa.
1974) (non-lessee service station operator), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 834 (1975); Herren Candy Co. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 153 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Ga.
1957) (route salesman).
13. See H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978);
Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 925 (1953); Wahl v. Rexnord, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 573 (D.N.J. 1979); Tapeswitch
Corp. of Am. v. Recora Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,584 (N.D. Ill. 1977); see also
Greenville Publishing Co. v. The Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1974)
(exceptions to general rule of incapacity to conspire beween corporation and officers justified
when officer has an independent personal stake in achieving the corporation's illegal objective).
Nelson is the seminal case for the proposition that since a corporation can only act through
its agents, there can be no conspiracy between the corporation and its agents. The Nelson
court declared that it is "basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or
entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a private
individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corpora-
tion." 200 F.2d at 914.
14. See, e.g., H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.
1978) (unincorporated company store bearing parent's name unable to conspire with parent);
Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978) (four unincor-
porated producing divisions of same parent could not conspire), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939
(1979); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969) (unincorporated
grocery store division incapable of conspiring with grocery chain parent).
In the leading case of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970), the court of appeals reversed a
widely criticized district court decision which held that a corporation and its unincorporated
divisions, acting alone, could constitute the requisite plurality of actors to form a conspiracy.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that "if the doctrine of intra-corporate conspiracy is accepted,
there is no logical or practical way to avoid holding that all intra-corporate agreements are
or may be found to be conspiracies in restraint of trade." Id. at 84; cf. Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 469 n.4 (1962) (declining to decide whether a corpora-
tion could conspire with its allegedly autonomous unincorporated divisions since an indepen-
dent third party supplied the requisite plurality).
15. The concept of a corporation as a separate entity has been expressed in the following
manner:
The corporation is endowed with "legal entity." It is an artificial person in the
eyes of the law, separate from the persons of any shareholders, and as such can
make contracts, incur debts, sue and be sued in the courts, and perform such other
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entities in many areas of the law.' 6 For purposes of section 1 analysis, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that common ownership and control
will not liberate corporations from the impact of section 1." Accordingly,
legally controlled commercial acts as a natural person might be entitled to do. It
can do all of these things in its own name, without the direct participation of any
or all of the shareholding owners.
J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 65 (2d ed. 1968). It has also been noted that "[t]he private
corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting
relationships." Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. & EcoN. 305, 311 (1976) (emphasis in original).
16. The respondent's brief in the Copperweld case detailed the various areas of the law
in which incorporated subsidiaries are considered distinct from their parent companies: taxa-
tion, labor, ownership of securities, bankruptcy, contract liability, jurisdiction and venue, ser-
vice of process, indispensible parties, standing, judgments, and garnishment. Brief for Respon-
dent at 42-43 n.34, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3109 (1983). For cases in which taxation served as a basis for distinguishing incorporated sub-
sidiaries from the parent corporation, see F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't,
102 S. Ct. 3128, 3134 (1982) (autonomous operation of parent and wholly-owned subsidiary
prevented taxing the corporations as single enterprise); In re Chrome Plate, Inc., 614 F.2d
990, 996 (5th Cir.) (parent and wholly-owned subsidiary separate taxable entities despite filing
consolidated tax returns), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). For a case involving labor law,
see United Paperworks v. T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978) (parent not bound
by collective bargaining agreement between wholly-owned subsidiary and union). For a case
dealing with ownership of securities, see Engel v. Teleprompter Corp., 703 F.2d 127, 134 (5th
Cir. 1983) (stock acquired by wholly-owned subsidiary is not that of the parent corporation).
For a case focusing on bankruptcy, see In re Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd., 291 F.2d 22 (2d
Cir.) (parent and wholly-owned subsidiary are separate creditors under the Bankruptcy Act),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 925 (1961). For a case involving contract liability, see CM Corp. v.
Oberer Dev. Co., 631 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1980) (stock ownership, shared directors, and
other formal indicia of affiliation not sufficient to impose liability on parent for breach of
subsidiary). Courts often distinguish between a parent and a subsidiary in jurisdiction and venue.
See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fireboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983) (court must con-
sider "[aill the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the operations of the parents and
subsidiary"); Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1364 (10th Cir. 1974) (a parent's
"exercise of, not the opportunity to exercise, control is determinative"). Similarly, courts
distinguish parents from their subsidiaries for purposes of service of process. See, e.g., Stoehr
v. American Honda Motor Co., 429 F. Supp. 763, 766 (D. Neb. 1977) (service on subsidiary
is not service on parent despite total ownership and common officers and directors because
no exercise of control). For a case involving indispensible parties under FED. R. Civ. P. 19,
see Glenny v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 494 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1974) (wholly-owned sub-
sidiary held to be an indispensible party in action brought against parent corporation). For
a case dealing with standing, see Alcan Aluminum, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 558 F. Supp.
624, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (parent corporation does not have standing to challenge wholly-owned
subsidiary's tax liability). For a case in which judgments served as a basis for distinction, see
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 108-12 (1969) (judgment against
wholly-owned subsidiary does not bind parent). For a case involving garnishment, see Dunn
v. Printing Corp., 245 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (property of wholly-owned subsidiary
is not the property of parent subject to garnishment).
17. The theoretical foundation for the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine rests principally
in the following four Supreme Court decisions: Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 46-64 and ac-
companying text.
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it has been possible for a section 1 conspiracy to be committed by an incor-
porated subsidiary and its parent.
This notion of an intra-enterprise conspiracy'" is the subject of great debate.
On one extreme are those who believe that, as a matter of law, a parent
and its wholly-owned subsidiary cannot conspire because they are necessarily
a single enterprise.' 9 Conversely, those on the other extreme believe that the
mere fact of separate incorporation is enough to find the plurality of actors
needed for a section 1 conspiracy.2" Amidst this dispute lie subtle distinc-
18. Writers have labeled conspiracies among related firms a number of ways. George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974) ("thin");
Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27, 51 (1949) ("corporate self-
abuse"); Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 23 ("intra-corporate"); Kempf, supra note 7, at
173 ("bathtub"); Wilberding, An Ominious Warning for Antitrust Law: The Disposition of
the "Bathtub" Conspiracy-As Applied to Unincorporated Divisions-May Have Left a Tell-
Tale Ring Around the Tub, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 45 (1971) ("bathtub"); Comment, Corporate
Liability for Intra-Corporate Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 248, 248
("intra-corporate"). This Comment uses the term intra-enterprise conspiracy to refer only to
alleged agreements between related, but separately incorporated, firms. Further, this Comment
assumes that the subsidiaries involved in the alleged conspiracy are either wholly or substan-
tially owned by the parent corporation. When subsidiaries are only substantially owned, it is
further assumed that minority shareholders own stock only for investment purposes. Implicit
in this assumption is that partially-owned corporations normally operate independently of minor-
ity stockholders and can even compete with minority affiliates. Other commentators have made
similar assumptions. See Barndt, supra note 7, at 188; Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note
7, at 662 n.6; Note, Suggested Standard, supra note 7, at 717 n.3. This Comment vehemently
opposes adoption of specific percentages of ownership as a means for determining section 1
liability. See infra note 206. But see Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 30 (suggesting immu-
nity to section 1 liability for related firms where parent maintains majority stock ownership).
19. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7; McQuade, supra note 7; Stengel, supra note 7;
Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note 7. Some critics observe that there is little difference be-
tween a division that cannot conspire with its parent and a subsidiary that can. See, e.g., Handler
& Smart, supra note 7, at 72 (noting that attempts to distinguish between unincorporated divi-
sions and corporate subsidiaries "exalts form over substance without providing any counter-
vailing antitrust benefits"). Further, it has been argued that application of section 1 to incor-
porated subsidiaries unduly penalizes legitimate choices of corporate form. See, e.g., P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 399-400 (3d ed. 1981). Areeda declares, "The business, tax, social or strategic
reasons for separate incorporation do not make it any more or less likely that competition
is being harmed by the defendant's activities. The fortuity of independent incorporation does
not serve to identify the behavior that the antitrust laws should control." Id.; see also McQuade,
supra note 7, at 183 ("the only safe way to avoid violating the Sherman Act is to give up
the advantages of multicorporate organization and consolidate into single legal units"). Thus,
some courts and commentators have attempted to restrict the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine to situations that more accurately reflect the reality of corporate autonomy. See infra
notes 142-90 and accompanying text; Note, Suggested Standard, supra note 7.
20. See, e.g., Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d
20, 33-34 & n.49 (3d Cir.) (despite showing that subsidiary was merely the vertical sales arm
of its parent, plurality of actors was present), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); H & B Equip.
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1978) (parent firm and
its leasing subsidiary capable of conspiracy); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Bldrs., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974) (capacity to conspire found notwithstanding evidence
of vertical corporate interrelationship among affiliated swimming pool recirculation system firms).
But cf. White v. Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1982) (affirming summary judgment in
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tions that rest on the particular facts and circumstances of the often com-
plex scenarios found in antitrust litigation.2
In short, a definitive pronouncement as to what constitutes distinct and
separate entities is sorely needed. In enunciating a proper standard, the
Supreme Court must be wary of adopting an interpretation that would render
section 1 impotent to prevent unreasonable, anticompetitive restraints of trade
by affiliated corporations. To hold that a parent firm lacks the capacity,
under any circumstances, to conspire with its subsidiary, would eviscerate
section 1 and allow significant anticompetitive conduct to hide behind the
corporate shield.
This Comment asserts that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine should
be limited to situations in which (1) the affiliated corporations function as
distinct economic units; and (2) the affiliated corporations' concerted efforts
are directed toward restraining the trade of unrelated third parties. When
corporations are functionally nondistinct, or when agreements between the
related firms concern internal policy with only secondary effects on third
parties, section 1 should be inapplicable. Nevertheless, when two functionally
distinct corporations combine the leverage of their separate business rela-
tionships to restrain the trade of unrelated third parties, corporate form
should not preclude section 1 liability. Courts should not allow form to prevail
over substance by blindly exempting affiliated corporations' conduct from
the reach of section 1. Rather, courts should undertake a preliminary fac-
tual inquiry to determine whether treating the affiliated firms as distinct en-
tities is sensible.
It is essential to note that this inquiry is only a prelude to section 1 analysis.
Merely because firms have the capacity to conspire does not mean that the
challenged activity is the result of joint conduct. A parent corporation may
dictate its orders to a subsidiary, or a subsidiary may restrain trade without
waiting for its parent's agreement. Further, a finding of capacity to con-
spire is not proof of a section 1 violation. The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Sherman Act to prohibit only those combinations that unreasonably
restrain trade.22 Thus, once capacity to conspire is found to exist, the
favor of newspaper and its wholly-owned distribution subsidiary because appellants failed to
allege specific conspirators); Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093, 1094-95
& n.l (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (dictum in footnote found lack of plurality from evidence
that the related firms did not hold themselves out as competitors).
21. For a typical weighing of the various factors used to determine whether subsidiaries
are separate units capable of violating section 1, see Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld
Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983). In that case, the
court of appeals considered the following:
[Tihe extent of the integration of ownership, whether the two corporations have
separate managerial staffs, . . . the extent to which significant efficiencies would
be sacrificed if they were required to act as two firms, their history, whether they
functioned as separate firms before being partially integrated, and finally, the ex-
tent to which they may, acting as one, wield market power which they would not
possess if viewed as separate ffrms.
Id. at 318 (quoting L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 328 (1977)).
22. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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section 1 analysis proceeds to determine whether there was a restraint
of trade and whether that restraint was unreasonable. Firms need not worry
about section 1 liability unless they have unreasonably restrained trade. In
this light, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine becomes a useful tool to
promote-not hinder-robust competition.
This Comment's suggested limitation on the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine comports with antitrust objectives identified in legislative history, judicial
precedent, and economic reality. By tracing the Supreme Court origins of
this doctrine, this Comment will analyze its present status in the lower courts
and reveal the inadequacy of alternative methods to reach unreasonable
restraints of trade by affiliated corporations. Finally, an examination of the
suggested standard as applied to various scenarios will illustrate its utility
to the bar, bench, and business community.
SECTION 1: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Whether affiliated corporations are capable of engaging in a section 1 con-
spiracy should depend upon a consideration of the Sherman Act's legislative
history and, particularly, a consideration of "the particular evils at which
the legislation was aimed." 23 A review of the Act's history and interpreta-
tion reveals that it was aimed not at form, but at reaching underlying
restraints of trade. That review also indicates that the Act's framers intended
that any corporation, regardless of its affiliated nature, be considered distinct
and, therefore, subject to section I liability.
The Sherman Act was enacted in response to the accelerated concentra-
tion of wealth and industry during the Industrial Revolution.2 ' Laissez-faire
capitalism had resulted in enormous aggregations of power, and Congress
responded by adopting the Sherman Act, which totally prohibited combina-
23. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940). In this case, the Supreme Court
recognized:
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated in terms of precision or of
crystal clarity and the Act itself did not define them. In consequence of the vagueness
of its language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have been left to give content
to the statute, and in the performance of that function it is appropriate that the
courts should interpret its word in light of the legislative history and of the par-
ticular evils at which the legislation was aimed.
Id. (footnotes & citations omitted).
24. Senator Sherman, who helped draft the original bill and provided a major impetus behind
the Sherman Act, made the following observations:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and
among them all none is more threatening than the inequality of condition, of wealth,
and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the concentration
of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade and to break
down competition.
CONG. REc. 2,460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). The legislative history of the Sherman
Act can also be found in E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (1978).
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tions in restraint of trade.25 Nevertheless, some members of Congress did
not consider these combinations to be inherently evil. As Senator Sherman
explained:
I am not opposed to combinations in and of themselves; I do not care
how much men combine for proper objects; but when they combine with
a purpose to prevent competition, so that if a humble man starts a business
in opposition to them . . . they will crowd him down . . . and when
that is established by evidence that can not be questioned, then it is the
duty of the courts to intervene and prevent it by injunction and by the
ordinary remedial rights afforded by the courts.2"
Essentially, section 1 of the Act was intended to preserve competition by
prohibiting combinations that restrict competition between business units that
otherwise would compete, and by prohibiting concerted efforts to restrict
competitive opportunity or the commercial freedom of others." Accordingly,
Senator Sherman's original bill explicitly condemned "all arrangements, con-
tracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations
made with a view . . . to prevent full and free competition .... -21 In
defending his bill on jurisdictional grounds, Senator Sherman viewed cor-
porations as "distinct and separate personalities .... -29 Moreover, as Senator
Teller declared, "Each corporation is a creature by itself." 3 Finally, upon
revision of the bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee changed the phraseology
to its present form, but inserted section 8 to make it clear that "the term
'person' was intended to apply to corporations.""
After passage of the Sherman Act, the Court interpreted its legislative
purpose to be the prohibition of combinations that unreasonably restrict com-
petitive conditions.32 In an often quoted passage from Northern Pacific
Railway v. United States," the Supreme Court declared that "[tihe Sher-
man Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition." 3 ' Nevertheless, com-
petition was not given the free-wheeling mandate of nineteenth-century laissez-
25. The Sherman Act "was deemed essential by an all-embracing enumeration to make sure
that no form of contract or combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign
commerce was brought about could save such restraint from condemnation." Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
26. 21 CoNo. REC. 2,569 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
27. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911); see also Weston, The Ap-
plication of the Sherman Act to "Integrated" and "Loose" Industrial Combinations, 7 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 42, 51 (1940) (distinguishing "self-imposed" restraints between two or
more persons and "coercive" restraints by common action against third persons).
28. S. 3445, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888) (emphasis added).
29. E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 23 n.1.150. Section 8 of the Sherman Act provides
that "[tihe word 'person' shall be deemed to include corporations .. " 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
30. 21 CONG. REC. 2571 (1890) (statement of Sen. Teller) (referring to the affiliated cor-
porations in the Standard Oil Trust).
31. Id. at 2,464 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
32. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
33. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
34. Id. at 4.
19831
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
faire ideology. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has noted that a fundamen-
tal purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity and
to protect the public from monopolistic and conspiratorial attempts to distort
market forces."
While recognizing the goals of the Sherman Act, the Court has maintained
that the form of a party's enterprise could not serve as a shield from Sher-
man Act liability. For example, in Appalachian Coals v. United States,36
the Court declared that the Act "does not go into detailed definitions which
might work either injury to legitimate enterprise or through particulariza-
tion defeat its purposes by providing loop holes for escape." 37 Instead, the
Act called for "vigilance in the detection and frustration of all efforts un-
duly to restrain the free course of interstate commerce .. "38 As one anti-
trust scholar has concluded, Congress intended the Act to be flexible to
preclude "restrainers of trade" from finding "subterfuge behind new forms
of combinations or methods. What mattered was whether trade was
restrained."39 Hence, legislative history and judical interpretation reflect a
cognizance of the corporation as a distinct entity for purposes of section
1 liability and an emphasis on the anticompetitive effects of concerted ac-
tions, regardless of whether the actors are affiliated corporations.
FORMULATION OF THE INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE
In 1941, the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. General Motors
Corp.," the first case to support expansive judicial authority to reach anti-
competitive conduct by affiliated corporations under section 1. That case
involved General Motors (GM) and three of its wholly-owned subsidiaries:
GM Sales, GM Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), and GMAC of Indiana.
These subsidiaries were convicted of violating section 1 because they coor-
dinated tying agreements to coerce individual GM dealers to finance pur-
chases through GM, and because they forced customers to finance their pur-
chases through GMAC.4' The asserted coercive efforts included acceptance
of GMAC as a condition precedent to franchising a new dealership, threats
35. See Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923) ("The
fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity and to protect
the public against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through ... combina-
tions in restraint of trade.").
36. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
37. Id. at 360. The Court further emphasized its disdain for legal niceties in Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), by explaining that the Act "does embrace
and declare to be illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever
nature, and whoever may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily operates in restraint
of trade .. " Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
38. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
39. H. THOR.ELLI, TH FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 229 (1955) (emphasis in original).
40. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
41. Id. at 412.
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of franchise cancellation, delays in delivery, and shipment of nonconform-
ing goods."2
GM argued that the corporations were essentially a single enterprise and,
thus, did not have the capacity to conspire. 3 Disagreeing, the court declared
that by accepting the benefits of separate incorporation, GM could no longer
escape liability under the Sherman Act." The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
a violation of section 1 hinged not so much on the form of the corporate
relationship as it did on the presence or absence of a restraint of trade."'
Six years later, the Supreme Court closely parallelled the Seventh Circuit's
General Motors opinion when it addressed the issue of affiliated corpora-
tions' capacity to conspire under section 1. In United States v. Yellow Cab,"6
the government claimed that the defendants violated sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain and monopolize interstate trade
in selling taxicabs in Chicago, Pittsburgh, New York, and Minneapolis, and
in providing cab services in the Chicago area. 7 Reversing the district court's
dismissal, the Yellow Cab Court stressed that Sherman Act liability depended
on, the presence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, not on corporate
interrelationships." Thus, the affiliated nature of the various cab companies
was not an impediment to finding a conspiracy in Yellow Cab.
42. Id. at 392-97.
43. Id. at 404.
44. The Seventh Circuit stated:
[T]he appellants [cannot] enjoy the benefits of separate corporate identity and escape
the consequences of an illegal combination in restraint of trade by insisting that
they are in effect a single trader. The test of illegality under the Sherman Act is
not so much the particular form of business organization effected, as it is the presence
of restraint of trade and commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
Some commentators have suggested that the italicized portion of the preceding quote is an
erroneous interpretation of the law which, if taken literally, would subject commonplace deci-
sions of cooperative pricing and market allocation between the parent and subsidiary to per
se illegality under section 1. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 27; McQuade, supra note
7, at 191; Stengel, supra note 7, at 11. Yet this view represents a strained construction of
the Seventh Circuit's holding. At face value, the holding reflects more concern over the evils
of restraints on trade than over the technical niceties of corporate organization-hardly a novel
idea in antitrust law.
45. 121 F.2d at 404.
46. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
47. Id. at 220. The complaint alleged that one stockholder who originally owned a taxicab
manufacturing company, and his associates who jointly held controlling interests of varied
amounts in five affiliated corporations, were requiring their companies to purchase taxicabs
from the manufacturing affiliate. Id. at 220-24.
48. The Court declared that "any affiliation or integration flowing from an illegal con-
spiracy cannot insulate the conspirators from the sanctions which Congress has imposed. The
corporate interrelationships .. .are not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act.
That statute is aimed at substance rather than form." Id. at 227.
Once again, commentators have sought to avoid the rather explicit language of Yellow Cab.
See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 29 ("the opinion stands for the proposition that
a series of acquisitions, if they result in an unreasonable restraint of trade, may constitute
a violation of section 1"); Kempf, supra note 7, at 175 (Yellow Cab means that section 1
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In 1951, the Court solidified this expansive intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons. 9 In Kiefer-Stewart,
a wholesale druggist brought a private treble damage action against Seagram
and Calvert, two wholly-owned subsidiaries of Distiller Corporation Seagram,
Ltd., of Canada (Distiller). The plaintiff charged that the Distiller subsidiaries
pursued a policy of limiting liquor sales to those wholesalers who would
resell at prices fixed by Seagram and Calvert." The Court, in a majority
opinion authored by Justice Black, rejected the defendants' argument that
their status as mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandising
unit made it impossible for them to conspire within the meaning of section
l.' Citing Yellow Cab, the Court found that the defendants' contention
''runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership and control
does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws." 2 In
so doing, the Kiefer-Stewart decision reiterated the Court's reluctance to allow
related firms to gain exemption from section 1 liability.
That same term, the Court issued another opinion that is significant to
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States 3 affirmed a district court holding that a domestic corporation con-
spired with two of its foreign affiliated corporations to restrain trade in the
manufacture and sale of antifriction bearings.54 In Timken, the United States
brought suit against a domestic corporation (American Timken), alleging a
conspiracy between American Timken, British Timken, Ltd. (British Timken),
and Societe Anonyme Francaise Timken (French Timken) to eliminate com-
petition in the world market for the antifriction bearings." As affirmed by
the Supreme Court, the district court found 6 that the affiliated corpora-
tions had engaged in a series of comprehensive agreements dating back to
1909 to divide markets, to fix prices of products of one corporation sold
in the territory of the others, to cooperate to protect their markets and
eliminate outside competition, and to participate in cartels to restrict American
is transgressed when disparate owners form a parent to effectuate a preconceived objective
to restrain trade); Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 40 (interpreting Yellow Cab to mean
that otherwise lawful business practices may violate the antitrust laws when undertaken for
the purpose of monopolizing). While the commentators note that at times the Court appeared
to be referring to section 2's prohibition against conspiracies to monopolize, rather than the
more lenient section 1 which rarely requires anticompetitive intent, the language concerning
the capacity of affiliated corporations to conspire is unavoidably explicit.
49. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
50. Id. at 212.
51. Id. at 215.
52. Id. As with General Motors and Yellow Cab, commentators have sought to avoid the
plain language of the Kiefer-Stewart opinion. See, e.g., Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at
45 (finding third-party wholesaler in Kiefer-Stewart to supply the needed plurality of actors).
Yet, not even Professor Handler can agree that the intra-enterprise conspiracy issue was un-
necessary to reach the Kiefer-Stewart result. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 31.
53. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
54. Id. at 605.
55. Id. at 596.
56. See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 185 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
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imports and exports." In rejecting the defendants' contention that they were
merely operating a single enterprise, the 'Timken Court relied on Kiefer-
Stewart for the proposition that corporations are not liberated from the im-
pact of the antitrust laws as a result of their common ownership or control.58
Further, the Court was not persuaded by the defendants' argument that the
agreements escaped liability because they were only part of a joint venture.
The Court reasoned that any combination between separately incorporated
firms could probably be labeled a "joint venture." 9
Nevertheless, the defendants' arguments in Timken did not go completely
unnoticed. Justice Reed, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice
Vinson, admitted the "strange" result of finding a conspiracy between af-
filiated corporations in foreign markets.6" Yet, Justice Reed acknowledged
that to hold otherwise "would open wide the doors for violation of the Sher-
man Act at home and in foreign fields." 61
57. 341 U.S. at 595-96. The Timken Court traced the historical and legal relationships among
the affiliated corporations. Control in the affiliated firms varied. Originally, American Timken
and an English businessman named Dewar purchased the stock of British Timken. After British
Timken sold some of its stock to the public, American Timken's shares were diluted to 30%
and Dewar's to 24%. American Timken and Dewar then organized French Timken and divided
the stock equally between them. Dewar died while appeal of the case was pending, leaving
American Timken with an option to purchase his stock in British and French Timken. If exer-
cised, the option would have brought American Timken's control to 54% of British Timken
and 100% of French Timken. Id. Thus, American Timken had potential and effective control
over the related firms.
58. Id. at 597-98. The Court reasoned that merely labeling an agreement as a "joint ven-
ture" could not remove its trade restraining characteristics. Id. at 598.
59. Id. at 598.
60. Id. at 601-02 (Reed, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Reed, J., concurring). Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion, found the
characteristics of foreign markets to warrant special consideration. Id. at 606-08 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). Justice Jackson noted that many forms of trade restraints already existed in foreign
markets. Id. at 607 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Moreover, he argued that many foreign govern-
ments restrict business operations on their soil unless they become separately incorporated; ac-
cordingly, it was unfair to attach too much weight to labels. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
In sum, Justice Jackson found application of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine to be
equitable in domestic markets, while its application in foreign markets failed to recognize the
complexity of the many legal and economic factors comprising the decision to incorporate foreign
subsidiaries separately. Id. at 608 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Under the Sherman Act, there are special considerations for foreign subsidiaries. For exam-
ple, the Alcoa doctrine provides that conspiratorial efforts involving foreign operations must
have an effect on trade within the United States before section 1 will be applied. United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945). For Supreme Court cases
utilizing the effects test, see Continental Ore v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690 (1962); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Furthermore, in
its guide for international operations, the Justice Department has endorsed a more restrictive
view of the intra-enterprise doctrine. See ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977). According to that guide, the Antitrust Division
will attack only "coercive attempts by members of a corporate group to drive third parties
out of business or out of markets." Id. at 12 n.26. This view substantially comports with
the second prong of this Comment's suggested standard, which recommends application of
section 1 when related firms are distinct economic units and their conduct is directed toward
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The doctrine lay dormant until 1968, when the Court reiterated its sup-
port for an expansive intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in Perma Life Muf-
flers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.62 In Perma Life, the Court reversed
a summary judgment against a franchisor (Midas) and its parent (Interna-
tional) for alleged restraints imposed on Midas franchisees in violation of
section 1.63 The petitioners, operators of "Midas Muffler Shops," attacked
provisions of their sales agreement with Midas which, among other things,
mandated exclusive purchasing from Midas and placed territorial restrictions
upon the franchisees." The district court had rejected the petitioners' private
treble damage action against Midas, International, two other subsidiaries,
and various corporate officers and agents.6" The court of appeals, however,
while reversing the judgment on other antitrust grounds, held that the peti-
tioners' Sherman Act claim was barred because Midas and International were
part of a single business entity and, therefore, were entitled to cooperate
without creating a conspiracy."
The Supreme Court, in another majority opinion written by Justice Black,
reversed the Seventh Circuit's Perma Life holding with respect to the Sher-
man Act claim.6 7 In its most explicit and sweeping endorsement of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the Court suggested that separate incorpora-
tion in itself is reason enough to treat affiliated corporations as distinct en-
tities capable of conspiring under section 1.6 1 The Perma Life Court noted
that Midas and International received the benefits of separate incorporation
and, thus, were bound to accept its accompanying responsibilities. 69 The Court
bolstered its holding by stating that alternative theories of conspiracy equally
supported a finding of liability.70 Consequently, some scholars believe that
restraining the trade of unrelated third parties. See infra notes 195-218 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, a European scholar recently endorsed a similar view with respect to the con-
spiracy requirement for the competition policy embodied in Article 85 of the Rome Treaty,
the European Economic Community's founding charter. See infra note 132. For more exhaustive
analysis of the antitrust consequence of using foreign subsidiaries, see K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST
AND AMERICAN BUSINEss ABROAD (1958); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS (3d ed. 1982); E. KINTNER & M. JOEISON, AN INTERNATIONAL AN rITRUST PRIMER (1974).
62. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
63. Id. at 135. Professor Handler has pointed out that Midas, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of International, was a family controlled corporate venture that was wholly owned by a father
and son. See Handler, Antitrust Looking Glass, supra note 7, at 184.
64. 392 U.S. at 135. The complaint also alleged retail price fixing and tying arrangements
for Midas-related products. Id.
65. Id. at 135-36.
66. 376 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
67. 392 U.S. at 142.
68. The Court declared, "But since respondents Midas and International availed themselves
of doing business through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not
save them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate entities." Id. at 141-42
(citing Timken and Yellow Cab).
69. Id.
70. The Court observed that "[in any event each petitioner can clearly charge a combina-
tion between Midas and himself . . . or between Midas and other franchise dealers.
Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
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the precedential value of Perma Life is suspect because the basis for the
Court's decision is unclear." Yet, the Court's pronouncements in Perma Life,
Yellow Cab, Kiefer-Stewart, and Timken are unequivocal. Viewed in the ag-
gregate, these cases irrefutably proclaim that a parent firm and its separately
incorporated subsidiaries, or affiliated corporations, have the capacity to con-
spire under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The far-reaching scope of these pronouncements has dangerous implica-
tions; if a literal meaning is given to the Court's words, all cooperation be-
ween affiliated corporations is exposed to section 1 liability. Because many
agreements among related firms can affect trade, of either the related firms
themselves or of third parties, there is a vast potential for spurious lawsuits
alleging section 1 violations by affiliated Corporations. As a result, lower
courts and commentators have suggested more limited approaches to the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
LOWER COURT RESTRICTIONS
The lower courts have struggled in applying the broad language of the
Supreme Court decisions establishing the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Consequently, they have issued widely divergent opinions that have, in
themselves, been harmful to antitrust concerns. 2 The uncertainty and con-
71. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 33. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
reinforce a more modified version of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. For instance,
in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winkler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962), the Court
examined the reach of the Capper-Volstead agricultural exemption from the antitrust laws. Sunkist
Growers involved a section 1 claim against agricultural cooperatives. Upon examining the
economic reality of the combination, the Court found no indication that the use of separate
corporations had economic significance in itself, or that outsiders considered and dealt with
the agricultural entities as independent organizations. Id. at 29. The Court stated that, in the
context of the agricultural exemption, "grave legal consequences [should not rest] upon organiza-
tional distinctions that are of de minimis meaning and effect." Id. It therefore appears logical
that the Court would be willing to impose legal consequences when the use of separate cor-
porations does have economic significance. In any event, Sunkist Growers reflects the Court's
willingness to consider the operational realities of corporate structure.
The Court similarly considered the economic reality of organizational structure in United
States v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975). In Citizens & Southern, the Court
was faced with a § 1 conspiracy claim brought by the United States against a large bank and
a group of de facto branch banks, which it had established with five percent ownership. Once
again, the Court reiterated its well-established view that corporate "interrelationships . . .are
not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act." Id. at 116 (quoting Yellow Cab,
332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947)). Nevertheless, the Court considered the economic reality of the cor-
porate relationships and the alleged activities. Based on this examination, the Court reasoned
that the challenged conduct related only to internal management of the correspondent branches
and, because the banks were not independent competitors, the Court was unwilling to penalize
such necessary cooperation. Id. at 117-18. Thus, while neither Sunkist Growers nor Citizens
& Southern directly involved the classic intra-enterprise situations, see supra note 18, these
decisions indicate that the Court is replacing formalistic distinctions with distinctions based
on substance and economic reality.
72. Willis & Pitofsky succinctly summarized the effect of these decisions: "The net result
is thorough-going uncertainty-on the part of the enforcement agencies, and the courts-leaving
1983]
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fusion generated by these opinions demands comprehensive resolution by the
Supreme Court. An analysis of cases representing the various lower court
approaches sheds considerable light on both the underlying theory of the
intra-enterprise doctrine and the complexity of the judicial task.
A. The Expansive Theory
A literal interpretation of the Supreme Court's intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine recognizes that when firms incorporate separately, and thereby avail
themselves of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations,
the fact of common ownership will not save them from section 1 liability.73
The Third Circuit adopted such a reading of the doctrine and suggested that
common ownership or control would not liberate firms from the reach of
section 1.1" In Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp.," the court of appeals held, as a matter of law, that Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Corp. and its wholly-owned subsidiary Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Sales, Inc., were capable of conspiring.7" The defendants argued
that while legally distinct, the two firms were in reality a single enterprise
incapable of conspiring.77 Notwithstanding this evidence of unity, the court
no one able to point with confidence to the location of the boundary beween legal and illegal
business conduct in this area of the law." Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 21. This observa-
tion was made in 1968. Since then, over 125 decisions dealing with the issue have exacerbated
the confusion.
73. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968).
74. By doing so, the Third Circuit joined the First and Fifth Circuits in adopting an expan-
sive approach. For First Circuit decisions, see George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974) (related swimming pool recirculation system
corporations), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). But see White v. Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d
14 (1st Cir. 1982) (newspaper and distribution subsidiary). For Third Circuit decisions, see Col-
umbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.) (aluminum
producer and sales subsidiary), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Martin B. Glauser Dodge
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977) (automobile manufacturer and dealer sub-
sidiaries), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp.,
543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976) (parent petroleum firm and nuclear/chemical materials subsidiary);
cf. Higbie v. Kopy-Kat, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dicta) ("it is no defense
that the corporations are, in reality a single economic entity") (quoting Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 82 (9th Cir. 1969)); Rea v. Ford Motor
Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 864 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (automobile manufacturer and corporate sub-
sidiary dealer development and factory stores), vacated on other grounds, 497 F.2d 577 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974). But see Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp.,
461 F.2d 1093, 1094-95 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972) (technology parent and electronics subsidiary) (per
curiam). For Fifth Circuit decisions, see H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978) (construction equipment manufacturer and leasing subsidiary);
cf. Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 786 (S.D. Tex. 1971)
(holding that a section 2 conspiracy to monopolize is possible between a parent insurance credit
reporting firm and its subsidiary credit bureaus), aff'd, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973).
75. 579 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
76. Id. at 33.
77. Besides sharing joint management on several levels of operation, Kaiser Sales appeared
to act as the exclusive distributor of Kaiser Corp., a manufacturer of aluminum sheet and
coil, and had a long and extensive history of internal expansion through Kaiser Corp.'s direc-
tion. Id. at 23, 33.
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refused to exempt from section 1 those separately incorporated subsidiaries
that might comprise a single economic enterprise with their parents. Instead,
the Columbia Metal court reaffirmed the viability of the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine and held that Kaiser Aluminum and its sales subsidiary con-
stituted the requisite plurality of actors needed to form a conspiracy. 8
Interestingly, although the Columbia Metal court affirmed the doctrine,
it explained in a footnote that if limitations to the doctrine were deemed
necessary, a comprehensive set of factors weighing the particular facts and
circumstances of each case was both appropriate and consistent with
precedent." The court explained that such an approach recognized a line
beyond which a diminished level of business integration between two related
corporations warrants a conclusion that they are distinct entities, even though
elements of common ownership and control exist."0 Presumably, however,
the court believed that Supreme Court precedent mandated the approach
it adopted.
In addition to the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit advocated an expansive
intra-enterprise, conspiracy doctrine in H & B Equipment Co. v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co." The plaintiff, H & B, had alleged that a somewhat
obscure subsidiary of International Harvester, Harco, had conspired with
its parent to drive H & B out of the construction equipment market." Despite
reaffirming the well-established doctrines that a corporation cannot conspire
with its unincorporated divisions83 or with its own employees,", the court
was reluctant to apply similar rules to the incorporated subsidiary relation-
ship. Instead, the Fifth Circuit accepted the plaintiff's initial contention on
the issue of capacity to conspire. Echoing Yello.w Cab and its progeny, the
court emphasized the privilege of doing business as a separate corporation
and, thus, found that Harco and International Harvester could conspire to
restrain trade.8 Nevertheless, the court refused to hold that the related firms
did in fact conspire to restrain trade.86
78. Id. at 33.
79. Id. at 33-34 n.49 (quoting L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 328 (1977) and citing REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 34 (1955)).
80. Id.
81. 577 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1978).
82. Id. at 244. Harco Leasing Co. indirectly affected the plaintiff by making equipment
sales to a third party at a price below plaintiff's cost. Essentially, H & B was attempting to
reach International Harvester's unilateral conduct of severing ties with H & B, its former
distributor. After terminating the distributorship with H & B, International Harvester opened
a "company store" (division) in direct competition with H & B. The competition proved to
be too much for H & B, which left the market a year after the "company store" opened.
83. Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
84. 577 F.2d at 244; see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. The court also reaf-
firmed the "personal gain" exception. 577 F.2d at 244.
85. The court reasoned, "The parent's choice of form is important. Having availed itself
of separate incorporation for Harco, International Harvester marked it off as a distinct entity,
and the antitrust laws treat it as such." 577 F.2d at 245.
86. Id.
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Critics of the expansive approach 87 argue that overly formalistic distinc-
tions result from finding the requisite plurality of actors merely on account
of separate incorporation. 8 These commentators note that unincorporated
divisions can often exercise as much, if not more, automomy than a wholly-
owned subsidiary. 9 Further, they assert that to hold the incorporated sub-
sidiary liable, but not the unincorporated division, is to draw lines where
none exist. 90 Moreover, these commentators note that many legitimate reasons
exist for choosing the incorporated status for affiliates;" they argue that
punishing that choice illogically attaches antitrust significance to this legitimate
preference.
In addition, these commentators question whether application of per se
antitrust liability rules would subject everyday agreements, such as those con-
cerning price and market allocations between a parent and its subsidiary,
to Sherman Act treble damages.' 2 Critics also argue that application of the
87. See supra note 7 for a summary of the approach's recent critics. As the Seventh Circuit
recently noted, commentators have been "almost uniformly critical" of the doctrine. Independence
Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 316-17 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
88. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 44-46; Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note
7, at 665; Note, Suggested Standard, supra note 7, at 728. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS, 397-99 (3d ed. 1982) (criticizing the doctrine's allegedly formalistic distinctions); Com-
ment, All in the Family, supra note 7, at 67-68 (summarizing criticism of the commentators).
89. For a list of these authorities, see supra note 88.
90. See, e.g., McQuade, supra note 7, at 210-11 ("Antitrust policy steps out of its field
when it forces business to operate in the form of a single corporation with branches rather
than in a more convenient multicorporate form."); Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note 7,
at 667-68 ("it is inconsistent with antitrust goals to make section 1 liability turn on the firm's
choice of organizational form").
91. For an analysis of the various economic reasons to incorporate subsidiaries, see infra
notes 172-86.
92. Section I of the Sherman Act declares illegal every restraint of trade by two or more
persons. Yet, in early constructions of the Act this seemingly absolute mandate was given its
common law interpretation; only "unreasonable" restraints of trade were illegal. See Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Court reaffirmed this construc-
tion in the intra-enterprise context presented in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947), by declaring that "[tlhe test of illegality under the [Sherman] Act is the presence
or absence of an unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce." Id. at 227.
Nevertheless, the Court has since observed that
there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). This statement has formed the basis
of the per se doctrine in antitrust law. Under this doctrine, several types of agreements between
competitors are presumed to violate § 1. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-46
(1962) (tying agreements); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45-47 (1960)
(agreements to effectuate a resale price maintenance scheme); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (territory allocation agreements); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (agreements to fix prices); Eastern States Retail




intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine violates congressional intent and has, in
actuality, been used as a stopgap measure to reach essentially unilateral con-
duct that does not rise to an attempt to monopolize or to the level of
monopolization."' Finally, they find solace in alternative antitrust remedies
that the plaintiff can utilize to prevent anticompetitive conduct. 4 They con-
clude that it is no wonder that enforcement agencies have been hesitant to
apply the broad language of Yellow Cab, Kiefer-Stewart, Timken, and Perma
Life.
In sum, these critics, now joined by the Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC),' urge the Court to retreat from its earlier holdings
by repealing the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. Nevertheless, it must
be proven why the alleged problems of the doctrine demand abrogation,
and not simply limitation. Surely, the courts and Congress have not been
unaware of the doctrine's serious drawbacks; yet, neither has chosen to
eliminate it. Abrogation is both unnecessary and dangerous. Hence, it is
essential to develop a new and more equitable standard for evaluating cor-
porate affiliations. Although courts and scholars have grappled with limiting
theories and produced a myriad of creative solutions, none of these solu-
tions, standing alone, has resolved the problem.
B. The Competitor Theory
The basis for the competitor theory is derived from the language of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph T. Seagram &
Sons."1 The Kiefer-Stewart Court, in holding that common ownership does
not liberate corporations from the Sherman Act's conspiracy rule, stated that
"[t]he rule is especially applicable where, as here, respondents hold themselves
out as competitors."' 7 Yet, the Court offered no explanation for this un-
solicited statement.
Lower courts have latched onto the Kiefer-Stewart Court's statement as
standing for the proposition that the presence of competition between af-
filiated corporations, or the appearance of competition, will be a significant
factor, if not the dispositive factor, in determining capacity to conspire."
93. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 67-68; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 22.
94. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 66-72 (suggesting that significant restraints
of trade that harm competition be checked by the antimonopoly provisions of § 2 and the
FTC's prohibition of unfair methods of competition in § 5).
95. The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission joined as amicus curiae
supporting the petitioners in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 691 F.2d 310
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
96. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
97. Id. at 215.
98. Courts appear to be genuinely baffled by the significance of the presence or absence
of competition. When the competitor theory is employed, courts often overemphasize the theory
without articulating why it is important. See, e.g., J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co.,
704 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1983) (manufacturing companies and affiliated regional warehouses);
University Life Ins. Co. v. Unimarc, Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1983) (insurance com-
pany and insurance affiliates); Triebwasser & Katz v. AT&T, 535 F.2d 1356, 1358-59 & n.l
1983]
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For example, in Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 99 a district court posited
a corollary to Kiefer-Stewart's "holding out" approach. In Call Carl, an
independent service station operator claimed a section 1 conspiracy to fix
prices between a parent gasoline marketer and its subsidiary. Adding a new
twist to the Kiefer-Stewart caveat, Call Carl found a lack of competition
dispositive of the capacity issue.' Because the plaintiff failed to prove that
the parent and subsidiary were competitors, the court treated the related
firms as a single enterprise and, consequently, directed a verdict for the
defendants. '0'
Recently, this "noncompetitor" theory was employed by Judge Posner
of the Seventh Circuit in University Life Ins. Co. v. Unimarc, Ltd. 2 The
defendants in Unimarc were affiliated corporations charged with forming
a conspiracy to restrain the trade of the plaintiff-insurance company. Ignor-
ing the Seventh Circuit's "economic reality" theory, used in a similar case0 3
only months earlier, Judge Posner relieved the defendants of section 1 liability
by applying the Call Carl version of the competitor theory. Because the plain-
tiffs' complaint did not allege that the Unimarc defendants held themselves
out as competitors, Judge Posner rejected the conspiracy claim and stated
that the competitor test was "probably required" before a conspiracy could
be found.10'
(2d Cir. 1976) (AT&T and subsidiary telephone corporation); Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calhraft
Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (paper distributor and paper mill subsidiary);
Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1975) (Standard Oil parent and
gasoline marketing subsidiary), aff'd in relevant part, 554 F.2d 623, 628 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 923 (1977); Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1325-26 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (fire extinguisher manufacturer and wholly-owned subsidiary), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d
593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972).
Other courts have specifically stated that evidence that an entity was "holding itself out"
as a competitor bears little relevance to potential liability. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1981) (lack of
competition between related firms militates against finding of capacity to conspire, but not
conclusive), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip.
Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 511-12 (3d Cir. 1976) (appearance of competition between related firms
"irrelevant" to section 1 liability); Diehl & Sons v. International Harvester Co., 426 F. Supp.
110, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[w]hether or not the affiliated corporations are competing or non-
competing is not dispositive; even non-competing affiliated corporations may act in concert
to adversely affect free market competition") (emphasis in original).
99. 403 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 923 (1977).
100. Id. at 572-73.
101. Id. at 573.
102. 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1983).
103. See Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983). Unimarc was decided less than four months after Copperweld.
Nevertheless, Judge Posner failed to even mention the Seventh Circuit's previous decision in
Copperweld.
104. 699 F.2d at 852. Besides being inconsistent with Copperweld, the statement appears
to be an erroneous articulation of the law. Judge Posner relied on United States v. Citizens
& So. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975), to support his proposition that a finding of "holding
out" as a competitor was necessary for a per se violation of section 1. Yet, Citizens & Southern
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Further support for the competitor theory can be found in scholarly com-
mentary. In particular, an influential article by Professors Willis and Pitof-
sky advocated the competitor theory.' 5 Under their theory, related firms
that publicly adopt a competitive posture should be treated as separate en-
tities capable of conspiring under section 1.106 Other commentators, however,
have rejected this theory, noting that there is no articulated justification as
to why "competing" firms should incur additional antitrust liability.' 7 In
today's world of large conglomerate enterprises, many firms have subsidiaries
with dual product lines that compete in the marketplace; to hold such "com-
petitors" especially subject to liability focuses myopically on irrelevant
details.0 8 In analyzing conspiracy cases, courts should focus on the degree
of control exercised by the parent and the underlying restraint of trade-not
on the amount of competition, or lack thereof.
C. The Sole Decisionmaker Theory
The sole decisionmaker theory is often applied as an exception to the intra-
enterprise doctrine. According to this exception, when affiliated corporations
are owned and controlled by a single individual, no conspiracy can be
found.' °9 The seminal case on this point is Harvey v. Fearless Farris
neither involved an intra-enterprise conspiracy nor relied solely on the competitor theory. See
supra note 71. Judge Posner completely ignored Yellow Cab and its progeny, which held that
corporate interrelationships are not determinative of Sherman Act liability. Moreover, the dicta
in Kiefer-Stewart, from which the competitor theory arose, stated that competitors are "especially
liable"; it did not state that the absence of competition will immunize related firms from sec-
tion 1. See 340 U.S. at 215.
The practical effect of Judge Posner's approach is to "eliminate a whole category of lawsuits
where plaintiffs have attempted to gain treble damages by alleging conspiracy between a parent
and a subsidiary which do not compete." Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 54-55. It is unfor-
tunate that judges must go to such great lengths to express their disapproval of binding Supreme
Court precedent. By twisting Supreme Court language and wholly ignoring precedent, Judge
Posner violated both the spirit of the Sherman Act and the principle of stare decisis. For a
critical analysis of Judge Posner's attempts to replace the rule of law with his own ideology,
see Comment, Changing Configurations of Antitrust Law: Judge Posner's Applications of His
Economic Analysis to Antitrust Doctrine, 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 839 (1983).
105. See supra note 7.
106. The Willis & Pitofsky article also recommends the doctrine's application to actions by
firms incorporated for anticompetitive purposes. Id.
107. Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 53-55; McQuade, supra note 7, at 214-15; Stengel,
supra note 7, at 22.
108. "No social objective would be attained were subsidiaries enjoined from agreeing not
to compete with each other or with their parent. To demand internal competition within and
between the members of a single firm is to invite chaos without promotion of the public welfare."
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
34 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT].
109. Due to its limited scope, the sole decisionmaker theory has rarely been utilized and
has been employed more as an adjunct to other approaches. See, e.g., Las Vegas Sun, Inc.
v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979) (related hotel-casinos), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
906 (1980); Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979) (petroleum
products wholesaler and service station subsidiaries); Rayco Mfg. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593,
598 (N.D. Il. 1964) (sole stockholder of automobile accessory manufacturers); Windsor Theatre
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Wholesale, Inc., " I in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's sum-
mary judgment absolving the defendants of Sherman Act liability. In Fearless
Farris, the owner of a gasoline service station alleged that five gasoline sta-
tions and a petroleum products wholesaler, all wholly owned by an individual
named Lind, conspired to halt gasoline shipments to the plaintiff during
a nationwide gas shortage."' Because Lind was the sole owner and major
decisionmaker for the group of affiliated corporations, the Ninth Circuit
held that the case fell under the "one man show" exception." 2 The court
noted that under this rule, affiliated corporations owned and controlled by
a single individual are incapable of conspiring." 3 Thus, when one person
is at the helm making all the decisions, a conspiracy cannot be found.
Another Ninth Circuit decision, Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp.,"
expanded the "one man show" exception to include situations in which the
sole decisionmaker is not the sole owner. In Las Vegas Sun, the plaintiff-
newspaper brought antitrust actions against Summa Corporation, Hughes
Television Network, and Hotel Properties, Inc., all corporations owned and
controlled by the late Howard Hughes."' Through these corporations and
a sole proprietorship, the Silver Slipper Casino, Hughes controlled six hotel
casinos in Las Vegas. The complaint alleged that the corporations and various
individuals conspired to ruin the newspaper's business by withdrawing the
hotel casino's advertising from the paper."'6
As a preliminary matter, the Las Vegas Sun court observed that to con-
spire under the Sherman Act, the corporate entities must be "sufficiently
independent of each other for their concerted action to raise antitrust
concerns.""' After weighing the particular facts and circumstances of the
case, the court found that the chief executive officer of the parent firm made
Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md. 1950) (two motion picture theater
corporations owned and controlled by same person), aff'd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951). But
see United States v. Metro MLS, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,311 (E.D. Va. 1973)
(individual members of multiple listing service corporation could conspire).
110. 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979).
111. Id. at 452-53.
112. Id. at 455-56 & n.8.
113. Id. at 456 n.8.
114. 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980).
115. Id. at 616.
116. Id. at 615. The hotel-casinos were considered unincorporated divisions for antitrust
analysis, even though they were controlled by the separately incorporated subsidiaries. Id. at
616. Relations between the Sun and Hughes soured after Hughes fired the head of his Nevada
operations who had maintained a close relationship with the Sun. Id. The Hughes employee
established a $500,000 prepaid advertising account with the Sun for the six resorts. Shortly
after this advance, the Sun's owner testified in favor of issuing multiple licenses to Hughes
before the Nevada Gaming Commission. Upon the employee's discharge, the Sun's editorial
policy became hostile toward Hughes and his businesses. Shortly thereafter, the prepaid ac-
count was terminated and no new ads were placed in the Sun for the resorts. Id. at 617. The
district court found that the termination was prompted by legitimate business considerations.
Id. at 616-17.
117. Id. at 617.
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the decision to terminate the prepaid advertising account with the Sun, a
decision subsequently implemented by various personnel at the six hotel
casinos. The Las Vegas Sun court quoted extensively from its decision in
Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc.,II8 concerning the legal significance
of a single decisionmaker. This factor,'" coupled with the district court's
finding that the casinos were not held out as competitors, and did not ac-
tually compete, allowed the court to hold that the alleged actions were those
of a single entity and, therefore, not subject to section 1 liability."'
In sum, lower courts utilize the sole decisionmaker theory in two ways.
First, a conspiracy will not be found if the decisions raising potential anti-
trust liability are made by one person who is also the sole owner. Second,
even if the sole decisionmaker is not the sole owner, a presumption of in-
capacity will arise; this presumption may then be rebutted by other facts
and circumstances. Nevertheless, the sole decisionmaker theory poses an un-
necessary complication to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. When in-
voked, this theory merely questions whether the challenged affiliated cor-
porations function as distinct economic units. Consequently, the sole deci-
sionmaker theory can be subsumed under the first prong of the test sug-
gested by this Comment, which questions whether the affiliated corporations
function as distinct economic units.
D. The Anticompetitive Purpose Theory
Some courts agree that when companies form separately incorporated sub-
sidiaries to achieve anticompetitive results, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine bars them from hiding behind the guise of a single entity.'2' The foun-
dation for this theory rests in the Yellow Cab decision. In that case it ap-
peared that the defendant-subsidiaries were combined not to carry out the
legitimate business of the parent, but to effectuate a preconceived plan to
corner the taxicab market in major urban areas.' Since the companies were
118. 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979).
119. The Las Vegas Sun court observed that sole decisionmaking was only one factor, albeit
a major one, in weighing the totality of circumstances. 610 F.2d at 618.
120. Id.
121. Similar to the sole decisionmaker theory, the anticompetitive purpose theory is rarely
utilized. See, e.g., Olgilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981) (parent film pro-
cessor legitimately established nearby franchises to previous franchisee); Photovest Corp. v.
Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (parent film processor legitimately established
franchises near previous franchisee), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Brager & Co. v. Leumi
Sec. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Israeli bank and banking subsidiaries),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); I. Haas Trucking Corp. v. New York Fruit Auction Corp.,
364 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (no conspiracy found because fruit auctioneers' sole reason
for forming separate corporation for forwarding and loading fruit was to accommodate employees'
separate union status and fringe benefits, and not to effectuate an anticompetitive scheme).
122. As the Yellow Cab Court stated, control "was not obtained by normal expansion to
meet the demands of a business growing as a result of superior and enterprising management,
but by deliberate, calculated purchases for control." 332 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947) (quoting United
States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920)). The Court subsequently confirmed this reading
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formed with this anticompetitive intent, the Yellow Cab Court reasoned that
a conspiracy finding was appropriate. Thus, prosecution under section 1 of
the Sherman Act has been advocated whenever restraint of trade is the
primary object of the separate incorporation.' 23
The anticompetitive purpose theory actually relates more to the
unreasonableness of the trade restraint than to the capacity to conspire. The
practical problems in applying such a theory are self-evident. By emphasiz-
ing intent to discover the primary object of the combination, this theory
unnecessarily complicates section 1 and raises difficult obstacles for
plaintiffs. 2 ' Moreover, if the purpose of a corporate formation is to diminish
competition substantially, as in Yellow Cab, redress should be sought under
the Clayton Act, '25 not under the Sherman Act. Finally, the resultant af-
filiated corporations should function as distinct units in order to satisfy sec-
tion l's plurality requirement. Absent such separateness, the actions amount
to unilateral restraints, which are not violative of the Sherman Act.
E. The External Effect Theory
Another limitation proposed to eliminate the harshness of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine is the external effect theory. Under this ap-
proach, section 1 may be violated when the activities of affiliated corpora-
tions are designed to restrict the trade of third parties.' 26 Conversely, the
of Yellow Cab in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 520-23 (1948); see also
Kempf, supra note 7, at 175 (discounting the importance of Yellow Cab). For a more detailed
discussion of Yellow Cab, see supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
123. See United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218 (1947); see also Willis & Pitofsky, supra
note 7, at 35 (urging adoption of a limited doctrine that embraces the anticompetitive purpose
theory).
124. Intent is a more determinative factor under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1976). See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
125. Section 7 of the Clayton Act bars such mergers. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. V 1981). The
plaintiff might also proceed under section 2 of the Sherman Act for an attempt to monopolize,
monopolization, or a conspiracy to monopolize. An attempt to monopolize, however, generally
requires a significant share of the market, anticompetitive intent, and a dangerous probability
of success. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). Monopolization exists
when a substantial market share exists and the firm commits acts in furtherance of maintaining
the monopoly. Id.; see Handler & Steven, Attempts to Monopolize and No-Fault Monopoliza-
tion, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 125-26 (1980).
126. Courts appear reluctant to adopt the external effect approach. See, e.g., Olgilvie, 641
F.2d at 588 n.20; Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note 7, at 673 n.70. But see Thomsen v.
Western Elec. Co., 512 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (actions relating only to internal
operations of common enterprise inherently have a legitimate business purpose, lack anti-
competitive effects and, thus, do not violate section 1), aff'd, 680 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 348 (1982); REA Express, Inc. v. Alabama Gr. S. R.R., 427 F. Supp. 1157,
1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (because agreements between railroads and subsidiaries affected only the
related parties, no conspiracy found), aff'd mem. sub nom. Sowerine v. United States, 431
U.S. 961 (1977); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (actions of
a soft drink syrup manufacturer and its export subsidiary failed to have an impact either within
the United States or on its foreign trade; therefore, no conspiracy was found to exist); Chas-
tain v. AT&T, 401 F. Supp. 151, 160 (D.D.C. 1975) (telephone operating company and sub-
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theory permits a parent and its subsidiaries to enter into agreements that
are directed toward a related firm, such as territorial restrictions that have
only a secondary effect on outsiders.
The impetus behind this theory came in 1955 from the distinguished report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. 27
This report, upon which the Court has often relied,' 28 interpreted the Supreme
Court's intra-enterprise doctrine as standing for the proposition that section
I prohibited only those actions by affiliated corporations that had for their
"purpose or effect coercion or unreasonable restraint" on the trade of out-
side parties. " Thus, rather than ascertaining the functional distinctness of
related firms, this approach adopts an ad hoc analysis by examining the
alleged actitivies underlying the section 1 claim. When the activities are
directed at unrelated competitors, customers, or suppliers, section l's plurality
requirement is satisfied under the external effect theory.'
Similarly, some scholars contend that the potential effects of related firm
conduct upon outsiders neccessitate a finding of section 1 liability. Professor
von Kalinowski, for example, states that related firm "immunity" from sec-
tion 1 is "inappropriate."'' Professor Sullivan draws a distinction between
concerted action limited solely to internal management, and action which
erects barriers to entry by another firm, competitor, or potential competitor;
in the latter situation, Professor Sullivan would apply section 1 to the
challenged conduct of the related entities. "2
sidiaries' action had no external effect on competition; therefore, action was not violative of
section 1).
127. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 108, at 30-36. This committee consisted
of prominent practitioners, law professors, and economists who were "specialists in the anti-
trust or cognate fields." Id. at IV. Co-chairman of the committee was Stanley N. Barnes,
former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the antitrust division. The Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission was also a member of the committee.
128. For examples of cases citing the report, see Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282, 1294-95 (1983); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 439-40 (1978); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-92
(1978); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176 (1964).
129. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 108, at 34. The report further noted that
the Department of Justice only enforced the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine to the extent
of external effect:
The substance of the Supreme Court decisions is that concerted action between
a parent and subsidiary or between subsidiaries which has for its purpose or effect
coercion or unreasonable restraint on the trade of strangers to those acting in con-
cert is prohibited by section 1. . . .This interpretation is not inconsistent with
any case thus far instituted by the Antitrust Division.
Id.
130. Id.
131. J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 6.01 (2)(c)(i), at 6-28
to 6-31 (1983) ("Although the plurality of actors consists only of related entities, an immunity
from antitrust liability is inappropriate because of the effect of the challenged conducts on
outsiders.").
132. L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST § 114, at 328 (1977) ("concerted action by two 'legal'
persons which erects barriers to entry by another separate firm, a competitor or potential com-
petitor, can be a restraint of trade"); see also F. EASTERBROOK & R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
1983l
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While some critics have summarily dismissed the external effect theory
as "unworkable,"' 33 closer inspection of the theory's analytical premise reveals
its practical advantages. The Attorney General's Committee referred to
unreasonable restraints on trade that have a coercive effect on outsiders.
34
Critics worry that application of the doctrine will expose affiliated firms
to substantial liability for ordinary decision making. 3 ' Yet, these critics can
find comfort in this theory because the committee itself specifically adopted
the view that a parent corporation may allocate territories or set prices for
730 (2d ed. 1981) ("Activity within a firm or family of commonly-owned corporations is of
legitimate concern only when the entity is able to exclude competition by other economic units
...the proper question is whether there has been an exclusionary practice.").
At this point, a useful analogy can be drawn from our European counterparts. In article
85 of the Rome Treaty, the competition policy of the European Economic Community is detailed.
Similar to § I of the Sherman Act, Article 85(1) prohibits agreements that have as their object
or effect an impediment to competition. The same plurality issue arises, therefore, in the intra-
enterprise context. In response to inquiry whether Article 85 was applicable to concerted prac-
tices between a parent and its subsidiary licensees over territorial restrictions, the European
Court of Justice stated that Article 85
is not concerned with agreements or concerted practices between undertakings belong-
ing to the same concern and having the status parent company and subsidiary,
if the undertakings form an economic unit within which the subsidiary has no real
freedom to determine its course of action on the market, and if the agreements
or practices are concerned merely with the internal allocation of tasks as between
undertakings.
Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, 1167.
The author of a recent article on this subject confirms that
[tlwo tests to be applied cumulatively seem to be relevant for considering the ap-
plication of Article 85(1) to intra-concern practices. The first relates to the existence
of an economic unity between the companies belonging to the same group. Such
an economic unity exists where affiliated companies have no real freedom to deter-
mine their course of conduct on the market, but where one company has power
of control over the other companies and actually exercises that power ...
...The second test is ...to what extent the intra-group practices restrict
the competition between concern companies and others. Agreements or concerted
practices between companies belonging to the same group do not fall under Article
85(1) .... If, however, competition between those companies and other companies
is involved, Article 85(1) is applicable.
van Rijn, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy and Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, in ESSAYS IN EURO-
PEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION 123, 129-30 (D. O'Keeffe & H. Schermers eds. 1982).
In sum, it appears that the European community is already applying the two pronged test
suggested by this Comment.
133. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 49-51; McQuade, supra note 7, at 213; Stengel,
supra note 7, at 22-27; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 48-49; Note, Suggested Standard,
supra note 7, at 732-34.
134. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 108, at 34.
135. See authorities cited supra note 133. These critics claim that every agreement between
a parent firm and its subsidiary has the potential to restrain trade and, thus, have external
effects. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 50-51; McQuade, supra note 7, at 213; Stengel,
supra note 7, at 22-23; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 48-49; Note, Suggested Standard,
supra note 7, at 732-34. Since traditional antitrust policy subjects agreements to fix prices and
allocate territories to per se condemnation, everyday business decisions might be subject to
§ 1. See supra note 92.
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the subsidiaries under its control.'3 6 By exempting such actions, which are
traditionally considered per se violations in the intra-enterprise context, the
committee implicitly adopted the consistent use of the rule of reason
approach' 3 for agreements between affiliated corporations. Thus, actions
relating only to internal management, which do not have an effect on com-
petition, do not violate section I under the external effect approach; this
conclusion appears to be consistent with the Justice Department's past posi-
tion. In its Antitrust Guide for International Operations, the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice reiterated the government's view that it
would only use section 1 to "reach coercive attempts by members of a cor-
porate group to drive third parties out of business or out of markets."' 3 8
Consequently, contrary to the views of critics who believe that adoption
of the external effect theory would lead to abusive litigation over com-
monplace restrictions upon subsidiaries,'" the theory appears to be a
pragmatic step toward limiting the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine on
a principled basis. To avoid confusion over the different variations of this
theory, " 0 and to respond to critics who argue that any agreement has exter-
nal effects, the Court should adopt a clarified version of this theory as part
of its section 1 plurality analysis. Under this Comment's suggested approach,
the second prong of the plurality requirement is a determination of whether
the concerted efforts of the related firms are directed toward restraining the
trade of unrelated third parties. This form of the external effect theory, used
in combination with the economic reality theory,'" should alleviate any fear
that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine would be used to reach essen-
tially unilateral conduct relating only to internal policy. Therefore, coopera-
tion and restrictive agreements among related firms should be of little con-
cern to antitrust law, unless the combined power of two distinct entities coer-
cively restrains the trade of third parties.
F. The Economic Reality Theory
Under the economic reality approach, a court examines the particular facts
and circumstances of each case to ascertain whether the two entities that
are alleged to have conspired were, in reality, economically distinct.'4 2 Due
136. The committee report declared, "It seems inconceivable to hold per se illegal the mere
fixing by a parent of a subsidiary's prices or production, or the selection by the parent of
those persons with whom its subsidiary may or may not deal." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT,
supra note 108, at 35.
137. Id. For a discussion of the historical foundation of the rule of reason, see infra note 239.
138. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS 12 n.26 (1977).
139. See supra note 135.
140. See supra notes 128-32.
141. See infra text and accompanying notes 142-218.
142. If any trend can be discerned from the intra-enterprise cases it is the growing tendency
of the courts of appeals to examine the economic reality of the parent-subsidiary relationship
and the particular agreement at issue. By engaging in such a thorough analysis, the circuits
are following the Supreme Court's admonition that "each case arising under the Sherman Act
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to its detailed nature, economic reality analysis is necessarily fact-intensive.
Currently, three circuits' 3 have adopted this approach.
In Olgilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 144 the Eighth Circuit utilized the economic
reality theory to decide whether a photo processing franchisor and its wholly-
owned subsidiary constituted a single economic entity incapable of conspiracy.
The plaintiffs in Olgilvie were separately incorporated franchisees of the
parent Fotomat. 4 5 After being granted franchises to operate Fotomat pro-
cessing centers, the parent Fotomat infringed upon the plaintiffs' territorial
markets by establishing nearby processing centers.'4 6 The plaintiffs brought
various actions, including a section 1 suit against Fotomat and Fotomat Labs
alleging a conspiracy to eliminate the plaintiffs as competitors.' 7 The jury
must be determined upon the particular facts disclosed by the record." Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925).
For Seventh Circuit decisions adhering to this admonition, see Independence Tube Corp.
v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983); Havoco
of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1980); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat
Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); United States v. New
York Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949); United States v. General Motors
Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
For Eighth Circuit opinions following the economic reality approach, see Olgilvie v. Fotomat
Corp., 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981); Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d
1323 (8th Cir. 1973); see also TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,944
(D.S.D. 1981).
For Ninth Circuit cases following this standard, see Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp.,
610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Harvey v. Fearless Farris
Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979); Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management
Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1977); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
143. See supra note 142. The Tenth Circuit also appeared to adopt the economic reality
theory in Blankenship v. Herzfield, 661 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1981). The court of appeals was
not willing to rule on the intra-enterprise issue because more detailed fact findings were re-
quired. Id. at 846. Instead, the court remanded the issue "in view of the store's separate cor-
porate structures, the composition of their stock ownership, and the assertions made by plain-
tiff." Id. at 847.
In addition, the Fifth Circuit recently adopted a splintered version of the economic approach
in J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fittings Co., 704 F.2d 787 (1983). The Gibbons case ex-
emplifies the utter confusion that prevails in the lower courts. In Gibbons, the court utilized
a strange combination of the theories presented in finding that a valve and pipe manufacturer
and its regional warehousing subsidiaries could not conspire. The court initially recognized that
related firms may form a conspiracy. Id. at 795. Upon examining the "particular facts," however,
the court found that the corporations did not compete or "hold themselves out as competitors."
Id. Moreover, the court reasoned, the alleged conspiracy was actually the "unilateral decision
of the two men who ownled]" the corporations. Id. The court, therefore, held that the related
firms could not conspire. Id.
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit managed to invoke the economic reality theory to utilize
the competitor theory, adding the sole decisionmaker theory to buttress its holding. While this
shotgun approach may have helped the court to arrive at its holding, it remains rather puzzling
how two persons can make a "unilateral decision."
144. 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981).
145. Id. at 583.




awarded treble damages to the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed.' 8
Addressing the conspiracy issue, the Olgilvie court initially noted that legally
distinct corporations may be capable of a conspiracy.' 9 The mere fact of
separate incorporation, however, was not dispositive of the conspiracy issue.3 0
The court was hesitant to impose section 1 liability on what actually was
a single enterprise; to do so, the court reasoned, would "imprudently blur"
the distinction between conspiratorial conduct under section 1 and unilateral
conduct under section 2.' Accordingly, the court joined the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits by adopting the economic reality theory."'
The Olgilvie court then articulated evidence indicative of a single enter-
prise: identical name reference; interlocking officers; profit-incentives based
on the parent's profit; similar headquarters; consolidated external financial
statements; and a legitimate purpose of incorporation. ' Conversely, evidence
of separateness was meager: statements as to separate identity by executives;
separate personnel, equipment, machinery and costs; and separate billing.1
4
In view of these facts, the court concluded that Fotomat Labs was the "cor-
porate alter ego" of Fotomat and, thus, unable to conspire under section
I of the Sherman Act.' 3
The economic reality approach was also employed by the Ninth Circuit
in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co. "I Once
again, the particular facts of the case were critical to a determination of
whether the corporate entities were separate enough to be capable of
conspiring.' The defendants in Inglis were a parent corporation, ITT, and
its subsidiary, Continental. The subsidiary was engaged in the production
and sale of bread; the parent was not. Nevertheless, both were charged with
148. Id. The defendant, Fotomat, was also found liable on a fraud count. On appeal, it
sought reversal of both the conspiracy and fraud charges and reduction of damages and at-
torneys' fees.
149. Id. at 587.
150. Id. at 588.
151. Id. at 589. The court also rejected the external effect theory. Id. at 589 n.20.
152. Id. at 588. Olgilvie's immediate predecessor, Photovest v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d
704 (7th Cir. 1979), involved a fact pattern that was nearly identical to the situation presented
in Olgilvie. In Photovest, a franchisee of the drive-through photo-finishing kiosks brought various
actions, including a section 1 claim, against Fotomat. Despite initially recognizing the Supreme
Court's intra-enterprise cases, the court reasoned that separate incorporation was not conclusive
proof of the plurality of actors required for a § 1 conspiracy. Id. at 726. Instead, the court
declared that it must examine the particular facts to determine whether Fotomat and its chemicals
subsidiary, Fotomat Labs, were functionally distinct. Employing this analysis, the Photovest
court found that Fotomat Labs acted "merely as the processing arm of the enterprise." Id.
at 727. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the two related firms were actually a single
entity incapable of conspiracy. Id.
153. 641 F.2d at 589.
154. Id. at 589 n.27.
155. Id. at 590.
156. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 58 (1982).
157. Id. at 1054. The court stated that the purpose of examining the particular facts of
each case was to determine whether the corporations had antitrust significance as separate
economic units. Id.
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a conspiracy to restrain trade in the wholesale bread market. The district
court found that ITT was neither a competitor, manufacturer, nor supplier
to Continental." 8 Thus, the court granted summary judgment on the con-
spiracy issue, but the Ninth Circuit reversed." 9
The Inglis appellate court noted that ITT performed no other business
function than that of a holding company for a conglomeration of
businesses.' 6 ' Therefore, the court reasoned that Inglis was unlike situations
in which agreements between the affiliated corporations were internal and
did not affect the trade of outside parties.'"' Similarly, the case did not in-
volve vertically related operating companies that would tend to establish a
single enterprise.' 62 Thus, the central question for the Ninth Circuit was
whether the two related corporations functioned as a single economic unit." 3
The record in Inglis, however, contained no reliable evidence of such a rela-
tionship. Because the lower court granted summary judgment on the con-
spiracy issue, it had failed to examine the intricacies of economic reality.
Although the existing evidence indicated two distinct entities,'" the court
refused to rule on such a meager record. Instead, it remanded the conspiracy
issue to the district court for a determination of the separateness of the two
related firms. 165
The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Independence Tube Corp. v. Cop-
perweld Corp. 166 is another example of the economic reality theory. The com-
plicated fact scenario in Copperweld reflects both the complexity of the judical
task and the need for a definitive standard for limiting the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine. The Copperweld case involved a 7.5 million dollar tre-
ble damage award to Independence Tube Corp. against the Copperweld Corp.
and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Regal Tube Co., for conspiring to restrain
trade in the structural steel tubing market. 6 1 Independence alleged that the
concerted actions of Copperweld and Regal caused a third company, Yoder
158. Id. at 1055.
159. Id. at 1058.
160. Id. at 1054.
161. Id. (citing Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa
Corp., 610 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. (1980); Knutson v. Daily Review,
Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); DeVoto v. Pacific Fidel-
ity Life Ins. Co., 516 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975)).
162. Id. (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale,
Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979)).
163. Id. at 1055. Evidence failed to indicate that ITT had directed Continental's pricing policy
in the relevant submarket. Interestingly, the court believed that the evidence indicated that the
subsidiary enjoyed "considerable operating autonomy." Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1058.
166. 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
167. Id. at 313. The jury also assessed damages for tortious inducement to breach a contract
and commercial defamation counts. Those issues, however, are not currently before the Court
and were decided adversely to Copperweld. Id.
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Co., to breach its contract to provide Independence with a steel tubing mill.
As a result of the breach, Independence's entry into the structural steel tub-
ing market was delayed by nine months.'68 After its entry, Independence
led a substantial price reduction in the market, which had been character-
ized by high prices and high profit margins.' 69
Independence's complaint rested on various grounds,'70 one of which
alleged a conspiracy by Copperweld, Regal, and Yoder to restrain trade in
the structural steel tubing market. At trial, the jury found that Copperweld
and Regal had conspired, but that Yoder had not been a party to the
conspiracy.' 7 ' Damages were assessed at $2,499,009 (trebled to $7,497,027)'"
on the antitrust claim against Copperweld and Regal. An appeal to the
Seventh Circuit followed.
In an opinion authored by Chief Judge Cummings, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the judgment in all respects. 3 Part III of that opinion contained
168. Id. at 314.
169. This effect on competition was never developed fully at trial. See Brief for Respondent
at 7, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3901 (1983).
The facts in Copperweld illustrate the changing nature of corporate affiliation. Regal began
its existence as the wholly-owned subsidiary of C.E. Robinson Company. 691 F.2d at 313.
Thirteen years later, Regal was sold to, and became an unincorporated division of, Lear Siegler,
Inc. At the time, David Grohne was general manager for Regal; he became president of the
new division under Lear Siegler.
After four years under Lear Siegler, Regal was sold to Copperweld and once again became
a wholly-owned subsidiary with a separate corporate status. Id. at 313-14. Regal continued
to conduct its manufacturing operations in Chicago, while it shared corporate headquarters
in Pittsburgh with Copperweld. Id. at 314. Meanwhile, Grohne remained with Lear Siegler
and began to pursue the possibility of establishing his own steel tubing business. In furtherance
of this goal, he solicited investors and presented a financing proposal to a large Chicago bank.
Shortly afterwards, Grohne left Siegler, incorporated Independence Tube, and gave Yoder Co.
a purchase order for construction of a steel tubing mill.
When Copperweld learned of Grohne's plans, it first thought that an existing noncompeti-
tion agreement with Lear Siegler barred Grohne's efforts to establish a competing business.
This agreement, however, only barred Lear Siegler and each of its subsidiaries from competing
with Regal anywhere in the United States for five years. Id. at 313. Thus, Copperweld's counsel
advised that an injunction was possible in the event that Grohne made use of any of Regal's
technical expertise, which Copperweld had purchased from Lear Siegler. Copperweld's lawyer
then drafted a letter that was sent to numerous firms dealing with Independence, vowing to
take "any and all steps which are necessary to protect our rights .. " Id. What "rights"
Copperweld had were questionable. The company's stated rationale for sending the letter was
to prevent third parties from developing reliance interests with Independence that might prove
difficult to terminate upon future infringement by Grohne.
In any event, the letter deterred dealings with Grohne and resulted in Yoder's decision to
cancel its contract to provide a mill to Independence. Independence finally found a firm to
supply a mill, but their entry into the steel tubing market was delayed by nine months. Id.
As a result, the price decline corresponding to Independence's entry into the market might
have resulted earlier through increased competition.
170. 691 F.2d at 315.
171. Id.
172. Id. The addition of attorneys' fees brought the judgment close to nine million dollars.
173. Id. at 313.
174. Id. at 316-20.
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a comprehensive review of the ihtra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. The court
noted that had it not been for the jury's exoneration of Yoder, 7 ' the case
would have been an ordinary conspiracy case. Because of Yoder's exonera-
tion, however, the jury's finding of a conspiracy between two related firms
posed the difficult problem of intra-enterprise conspiracy.
The Copperweld court admitted that in a formal sense the requisite plurality
of actors was present.76 Nevertheless, it also realized that little difference
might exist between a wholly-owned subsidiary, such as Regal, and a fully
integrated division.' 77 The court reasoned that when differences between the
two are trivial, section 1 liability should not hinge on the corporate status
of the subsidiary.' 78 After noting academic criticism of the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine,'79 the Seventh Circuit focused on judicial attitudes toward
the doctrine. The court declared that judicial treatment of the doctrine was
necessarily more constrained because federal judges could not ignore the
precedential value of the Supreme Court's language in Yellow Cab and its
progeny. 8 0
Examining the practical operating relationship between parent and sub-
sidiary, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its support for the economic reality
theory.' 8 ' The Copperweld court reasoned that a totality of circumstances
must be weighed before a finding of capacity to conspire is upheld. Despite
admitting the ambiguous and unsettled nature of this fact-intensive
standard,'8 2 the court maintained that it had focused on the proper ques-
tion: whether the distinction between affiliation and integration is signifi-
cant or trivial.
83
The court of appeals acknowledged that it sought a compromise between
the harsh academic criticism of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and
the sweeping Supreme Court language. 8 " In seeking that compromise, the
court examined the district judge's jury instructions, which had relied on
a previous Seventh Circuit decision, Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.85




179. Id. at 316-17. The court summarized the "almost uniformly critical" academic discus-
sion of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
180. Id. at 317.
181. Id. at 318. The court employed a variety of factors to "decide when there is enough
separation between the two entities to make treating them as two independent actors sensible." Id.
182. Id. The court declared that the "test is admittedly in an early and unsettled stage of
development, as is inevitable with: (a) any test that involves the presence or absence of various
unranked factors, (b) the possibility that the list will expand or contract, and (c) as yet limited
application." Id. The court stated, however, that present uncertainties would be obviated as
the test was applied and refined. Id.
183. Id. The court gauged its standard "[in terms of evidence that is empirical, readily fur-
nished, and amenable to development at trial." Id.
184. Id.
185. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). In Photovest, the court
utilized a set of factors enunciated by Professor Sullivan to determine the historical and opera-
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The Copperweld court reasoned that the jury should examine the historical
and actual relationship between the related firms,. the economic efficiency,
and the degree of synergy'" resulting from the coercive forces of the two
firms acting together. By scrutinizing the lower court's jury instructions, the
Seventh Circuit found that the charge substantially complied with the fac-
tors enunciated in Photovest.'1" In addition, by employing a "clearly er-
roneous" standard to review the jury's determination on the control issue, '
the court agreed that the jury could have found the following factors to
be dispositive: Regal's previous separate existence; Copperweld's intent to
retain Regal's autonomy in daily policy decision making; managerial incen-
tive plans for Regal employees based on Regal's profitability; the existence
of a separate Regal sales force and clientele; and separately arranged Regal
supplies." 9 Accordingly, the court stated that the independent business con-
tacts of the related firms were relevant to the defendants' ability to coerce
others to a greater degree than any one of the firms could exert by itself.'90
Overall, the Seventh Circuit found a much greater basis for supporting
the jury verdict in Copperweld than in either Photovest'9' or Olgilvie.'92 Whi!.m
the economic reality of both Photovest and Olgilvie revealed a single enter-
prise, the economic reality of Copperweld revealed two entities; the Cop-
perweld court found the parent and subsidiary sufficiently distinct.
ANALYsIs AND IMPACT
The decision of the court of appeals in Copperweld is notable in many
respects. First, the court made no attempt to hide its cynicism toward the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. Although it dutifully adhered to the
Supreme Court precedent, the Seventh Circuit painstakingly identified the
doctrine's numerous flaws. Noting that academic discussion of the doctrine
was uniformly critical,' 93 the court stated that "while Supreme Court intra-
tional independence of the related firms. Id. at 726. The Copperweld court declared:
[Wle must decide each case on its particular facts. Some relevant factors to con-
sider include "the extent of the integration of ownership, whether the two corpora-
tions have separate managerial staffs, . . . the extent to which they were required
to act as two firms, their history, whether they functioned as separate firms before
being partially integrated, and finally, the extent to which they may, acting as one,
wield market power which they would not possess if viewed as separate firms."
691 F.2d at 315 (quoting Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d at 726 (quoting L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 328 (1977))).
186. Id. Synergism is defined as "cooperative action of discrete agencies . . . such that the
total effect is greater than the sum of the two or more effects taken independently." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2,320 (1976).
187. 691 F.2d at 319.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 320.
190. Id. If the two firms could have effectuated the same result by independent conduct,
they would not have needed to combine their efforts.
191. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
192. 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1951).
193. 691 F.2d at 316-17.
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enterprise decisions need not be read with complete literalism, of course they
cannot be ignored."
94
Secondly, unlike Columbia Metal,9 5 Fearless Farris,"
96 Las Vegas Sun, 97
Photovest,'9" and Olgilvie, 99 but similar to Inglis,2"' Copperweld involved
vastly different firms in a conglomerate enterprise. Regal Tube Company,
acquired as an ongoing concern in the structural steel tubing market, exer-
cised and operated an entirely different product line than Copperweld.2°'
Furthermore, Regal and Copperweld shared no common customers. Essen-
tially, Regal's contribution to its parent was gauged in profit-not product.
Most other economic reality cases have involved links in the same ultimate
market, such as partners in a vertical conspiracy 2 ' or competitors in a
horizontal conspiracy."' Cooperation would be expected between corpora-
tions in a vertically integrated enterprise or related competitors.2" ' Indeed,
management's strategic planning would be remiss not to consider subsidiaries
that, in some way or another, operate in the same market;"' vast inefficien-
cies might result from overlapping production or marketing. Antitrust policy
should be circumscribed to the extent that it inhibits necessary coordination
among related competitors or vertically related firms.
Like Inglis, however, Copperweld poses an entirely different situation.
Regal and Copperweld were functionally and operationally independent. In
economic terms, Regal "was a firm or a subunit of a firm that had suffi-
cient resources and autonomy to act on its own behalf in the marketplace." 2 6
194. Id. at 317. The court appeared to agree with one commentator who maintained that
Supreme Court precedent precluded it from considering whether related corporations lack the
capacity to conspire, under any circumstance. See Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note 7.
195. 577 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
196. 577 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1978).
197. 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979).
198. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
199. 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980).
200. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
201. 691 F.2d at 313-14. No evidence indicated that Copperweld acquired Regal with plans
of forward integration or future competition.
202. See, e.g., Olgilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981); Photovest Corp.
v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Harvey
v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979); Columbia Culvert Co. v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1978); H & B Equip. Co. v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
203. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
204. See Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 906 (1980).
205. See Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841,
860 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (recognizing that "common ownership or control of corporations will
inevitably bring about communications, understandings, and common actions among them in
areas reached by Section 1 such as production, distribution, and price"), aff'd, 658 F.2d 1256
(9th Cir. 1981).
206. R. RuMELT, STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 33 (1974); see also,
van Rijn, supra note 132, at 129 (describing economic unity where related firms have "no
real freedom to determine their course of conduct on the market," and where "one company
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In other words, besides its separate legal charter, Regal was a distinct
economic unit. The Sherman Act should not be blind to this legal and
economic reality. Antitrust policy should apply when the coercive power of
independent, related firms is heightened by coordination and utilized to
restrain the trade of outsiders." 7
This latter element of Copperweld, restraint on an outsider's trade,
highlights the utility of a combined economic reality/external effects test.
The Copperweld decision perfectly satisfies this Comment's suggested stan-
dard. Regal and Copperweld functioned as distinct economic units that in-
dependently exercised their business relationships to put pressure on firms
not to deal with Independence, an unrelated party. Such actions could not
possibly be labeled internal policy; rather, they were specifically directed
toward eliminating or restraining the trade of a potential entrant to Regal's
market.20 8 To further this goal, Regal utilized its relationships with mill
manufacturers, real estate firms, and steel suppliers. Meanwhile, Copperweld
utilized its own contacts with steel suppliers and banks. Consequently, the
parent firm and its subsidiary in Copperweld were able to exercise greater
coercion than would have been possible had they acted individually. Cop-
perweld, therefore, serves as a perfect example of why courts should not
ignore the synergetic effects of combinations merely because corporations
have chosen the subsidiary form.
The utility of this Comment's bifurcated test is further illustrated by ap-
plying it to other decisions involving the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
In Columbia Metal" 9 and H & B Equipment,"' the challenged corporations
has power of control over the other companies and actually exercises that power"). Actual
exercise of control, rather than some arbitrary percentage of stock ownership, should be the
essential inquiry. One scholar has noted that stock ownership is not the equivalent of control
in a realistic economic sense:
[O]wnership of capital should not be confused with-ownership of the firm. Each
factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is just a set of contracts covering
the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are
shared among inputs. In this "nexus of contracts" perspective, ownership of the
firm is an irrelevant concept. Dispelling the tenacious notion that a firm is owned
by its security holders is important because it is a first step toward understanding
that control over a firm's decisions is not necessarily the province of security holders.
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. & EcON. 288, 290 (1980).
207. A primary fear of combinations is that they will enhance the potential for success in
achieving an unlawful objective. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961).
Of course, the immediate purpose underlying the Sherman Act was to eliminate trusts, a par-
ticular form of conspiracy in which industrial giants pooled resources into a trust in which
each owned shares. See generally Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,
91 LAW & EcoN. 7 (1966).
208. 691 F.2d at 320.
209. 571 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). Columbia Metal involved an
alleged conspiracy between Kaiser Aluminum and its sales subsidiary. See supra notes 76-80
and accompanying text.
210. 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978). H & B Equipment involved an alleged conspiracy between
International Harvester and its small leasing subsidiary, Harco. See supra notes 81-86 and ac-
companying text.
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were links in vertically integrated enterprises. Moreover, their activities were
directed toward related third parties; both were former outlets of the parents'
product. The activities restrained were internal in nature and coordination
should have been expected. Thus, these decisions were incorrectly decided
for holding that the related firms could conspire. Conversely, Fearless
Farris,2  Olgilvie,22 and Photovest21 3 were correctly decided because the ver-
tically related firms in those decisions were merely extensions of the parents'
production line; furthermore, the activities alleged in both Olgilvie and
Photovest were directed toward related third parties. Therefore, a finding
of capacity to conspire was appropriate in these cases.
A case that is questionable under this analysis, however, is Las Vegas
Sun.2"" That decision appears to have been decided incorrectly because the
alleged conspirators, members of a conglomerate enterprise," ' were able to
combine their separate business relationships to exercise more power than
would have been possible if they had acted independently. Moreover, these
activities were directed at an unrelated third party, the plaintiff-newspaper." 6
Nevertheless, the presence of a single decisionmaker1 7 in Las Vegas Sun
militates against a finding that the related firms were distinct entities. Yet,
the intent of the Sherman Act counsels that concern for the underlying
restraint of trade should overcome the presumption of incapacity due to the
presence of single decisionmaker. 28 In any event, the suggested test's adap-
tability to Copperweld and other decisions reveals its potential for effec-
tuating the intent underlying section 1.
THE EFFECT OF ABROGATION
The Copperweld court noted that while various circuits have adopted several
limiting approaches, no court of appeals has abolished the intra-enterprise
doctrine "root and branch." 2 9 While this statement may be true today, there
211. 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979). Fearless Farris involved an alleged conspiracy among five
gasoline stations and a petroleum products wholesaler, all owned by one individual. The action
was brought by a former franchisee. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
212. 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1951). Olgilvie involved an alleged conspiracy between a photo
processing franchisor, Fotomat, and its subsidiary film chemicals firm, Fotomat Labs. See supra
notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
213. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). Photovest, like Olgilvie,
involved an alleged conspiracy between the parent, Fotomat, and its subsidiary, Fotomat Labs.
In both cases, the § I claim was brought by disgruntled franchisees of the Fotomat film kiosks.
See supra note 152.
214. 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980).
215. Id. at 616. Las Vegas Sun involved a holding company, Summa Corp., a television
network, and six hotel-casinos all owned by the late Howard Hughes. See supra notes 130-36
and accompanying text.
216. The various Hughes corporations withdrew all advertising from the newspaper, prompt-
ing the § I claim by the Las Vegas Sun. 610 F.2d at 617.
217. For a discussion of the sole decisionmaker theory, see supra text accompanying notes
109-20.
218. See supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
219. 691 F.2d at 318.
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has recently been a clarion call for abolishing the doctrine. The Reagan ad-
ministration has joined forces with various business associations to urge its
repeal.22 In urging abolition, these groups- point to the doctrine's overly
formalistic distinctions between subsidiary and division, the harsh effects of
per se rules, the widespread failure to enforce the doctrine, and the availability
of antitrust alternatives. Nonetheless, complete abrogation of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine is unnecessary, inequitable, and inconsistent
with the goals of antitrust policy.
A. Properly Drawn Distinctions
Critics of the doctrine consistently extol the redeeming virtues of corporate
subsidiaries.22 ' They identify several legitimate reasons for separate incor-
porations: managerial222 and financial flexibility, 3 federal tax advantages,22 '
favorable equity financing,225 foreign market entry,226 production and distribu-
tion efficiency,"' ease of accounting,228 and maintenance of morale.229 Ad-
ditionally, a parent firm can limit its contractual and tort liability by
separately incorporating its subsidiaries,230 and can limit its civil liability,
if it does business in other states, by creating a subsidiary to prevent service
of process on the parent corporation.23'
Yet the Supreme Court has never indicated that internal corporate effi-
220. The Justice Department, joined by the Federal Trade Commission, the United States
Chamber of Commerce and other business lobbies, wrote briefs in support of the petitioner,
Copperweld, to abrogate the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in Copperweld Corp. v. In-
dependence Tube Corp., cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3901 (1983).
221. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 62 n.193; Stengel, supra note 7, at 9.
222. See H. LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN 165-68 (1976).
223. If a particular operation is risky, that unit can be incorporated to isolate that risk.
Conversely, if one of the parent's operations is of greater interest to investors than to others,
it too can be incorporated to raise capital. See Stengel, supra note 7, at 9.
224. Recent changes have largely eliminated the tax benefits of separate incorporation. See
B. BITTER & J. EUSnCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
15-1 to 15-5 (4th ed. 1979); Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note 7, at 668.
225. See Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, supra note 7, at 381.
226. Separate incorporation allows a firm to avoid "insuperable barriers to foreign trade
like high tariffs, quota restrictions, and currency controls." Id. Some countries insist on the
corporate form to do business within their boundaries. See McQuade, supra note 7, at 196.
227. Modern management theory stresses the many benefits that can result from delegating
significant authority to local management. See P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT 575, 579-80 (1974);
T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S BEST-RUN
COMPANIES, 200-34 (1982). Of course, this does not necessarily imply that one must employ
the separately incorporated subsidiary form to achieve decentralization. The choice of control
and any ensuing efficiencies are usually derived from the manner in which a division or sub-
sidiary is structured, rather than from the fact of separate incorporation. See 0. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 151-54 (1975); R. RUMELT,
STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 38-40 (1974).
228. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 27.
229. See id. at 28.
230. Stengel, supra note 7, at 9.
231. Id.
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ciency will supercede the Sherman Act's objective of protecting competition.232
Moreover, the Court has emphasized that the privileges and benefits of
separate incorporation will not absolve firms from Sherman Act liability
simply because the firms are commonly controlled.233 Having accepted the
benefits of separate incorporation, related firms must also accept the
drawbacks, one of which is exposure to such liability.
Critics argue that there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about the use
of corporate subsidiaries, and thus the doctrine wrongly punishes this
legitimate structure.3 This argument, however, fails to reach the core of
the issue. Admittedly, no anticompetitive scheme is inferred from the mere
use of the corporate subsidiary. The concern only arises when, and if, the
parent and subsidiary unreasonably restrain the trade of outside firms. A
finding that two firms have the capacity to conspire does not necessarily
mean that those firms did conspire and unreasonably restrained trade. Con-
sequently, corporate form by itself is not dispositive of section 1 violations.
Instead, the primary concern of the Sherman Act is the result of the con-
certed action. 3
B. Per Se Rules Are Inapplicable
Historically, certain agreements among firms have been eschewed for lack-
ing any positive benefit. Courts, therefore, apply per se rules to categorize
such activies as automatically unreasonable. Although such rules eliminate
certain problems of proof,236 critics assert that this legal expediency imposes
harsh consequences upon the strategic planning of affiliated corporations.237
These critics maintain that because everyday decisions concerning prices and
market allocation have the potential to fall under the per se rubric, the doc-
trine places the chilling specter of treble damages upon ordinary decision
making.238
Nevertheless, even if it exists, this specter is easily eliminated. The judicially
created rule of reason approach239 can be expanded or contracted by the
232. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 68-69 (1977) (White,
J., concurring) (expressing reservations about focusing solely upon economic efficiency at the
expense of more "deeply embedded" principles). Similarly, under § 7 of the Clayton Act, and
according to the Justice Department's merger guidelines, efficiency considerations do not pre-
sent obstacles to preserving competition. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
580 (1967); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDEINES 42-43 (1982).
233. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968).
234. Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 62.
235. See supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (foreclosure
of access to market is per se illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
218 (1940) (agreements between competitors to control price are per se illegal).
237. See McQuade, supra note 7, at 215 (noting that per se rules are "antithetical" to the
complex economics of related firm conduct).
238. Id.
239. The classic formulation of the rule of reason approach to antitrust law was articulated
by Justice Brandeis:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind,
[Vol. 33:105
19831 INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
courts. 40 As other commentators have recommended, any harsh consequences
that per se applications may pose do not mandate abrogation of the
doctrine. 4 Rather, the common sense solution is simply not to apply per
se rules in the intra-enterprise context. When confronted with an alleged
conspiracy between affiliated corporations, courts can be directed to engage
in the more thorough rule of reason approach. Essentially, a court would
be forced to balance the competitive and anticompetitive consequences of
the related firms' conduct.24 2 Alternatively, and preferably, the per se rule
problem can be eliminated by utilizing this Comment's suggested approach.
When decisions are internal in nature and, therefore, are not directed at
unrelated third parties, section 1 should not be applicable. This approach
would alleviate corporate concerns that the Sherman Act might apply to
anything other than unreasonable restraints of trade.
C. The Relevancy of Enforcement
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine's impropriety is often tied to its
apparent lack of enforcement.2"3 The FTC seems to ignore it,"' and com-
mentators have emphasized past antitrust administrators' isolated statements
indicating a more limited reading of Supreme Court decisions.245 Notwith-
to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
240. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (over-
ruling the use of the per se doctrine for resale location restrictions and adopting the rule of
reason approach).
241. See Comment, Corporate Liability for Intra-Corporate Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade,
1968 U. ILL. L.F. 248 (recommending exclusive use of the rule of reason approach to intra-
enterprise situations) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Corporate Liability]; see also Comment,
All in the Family, supra note 7 (recommending that the principle of per se liability be aban-
doned for related firm conduct).
242. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
243. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 66; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 30-32.
244. Two early FTC proceedings gave credence to the doctrine by issuing consent orders
to prohibit parent firms from conspiring with their subsidiaries or affiliated corporations. See
In re Schenley Indus., 50 F.T.C. 747, 751-52 (1954); In re Distillers Corp.-Seagrams, Ltd.,
50 F.T.C. 738, 743-44 (1954). Over a decade later, the Commission rejected Schenley's request
for modification. United States v. Schenley Indus., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,987 (S.D.N.Y.).
Since then, the FTC has been largely unsympathetic to appeals to invoke the doctrine. See
Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 66 n.207.
245. "[W]e should not press to the limits afforded by past decisions wherever on present
evaluation those decisions appear to have gone too far. We should not, for example, attempt
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standing such perceptions, the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's Na-
tional Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws adopted the external effect
theory." ' In 1977, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department again
adopted a similiar view in its guide for international operations.24' Current-
ly, the Attorney General and the FTC agree with those seeking to repeal
the doctrine.2 '8
This apparent inconsistency and inattention is neither conclusive nor sur-
prising. The broad discretionary powers that Congress has delegated to ad-
ministrative bodies have fostered both neglect and abuse.2"9 While it is not
within the scope of this Comment to detail the fluctuating rigor of ad-
ministrative enforcement, suffice it to note that substantive changes in ex-
isting law should not be left to the whims of executive prerogative. If changes
in the doctrine are needed, either Congress or the judiciary is the proper
institution to effect such changes.
to push the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as far as a free wheeling interpretation of the
Timken case might suggest." Turner, Address Before the American Bar Association, 10 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 685, 687 (1965).
246. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
248. Both parties joined as amicus curiae urging repeal of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine in the Copperweld case. See supra note 220.
249. It may be somewhat cynical to observe that antitrust enforcement may be influenced
by executive whims, But observe, for instance, the following dialogue between former Presi-
dent Nixon and White House Special Assistant Ehrlichman concerning the status of the ITT-
Grinnell appeal in 1971:
Ehrlichman: Well, they filed a notice of appeal. If we do not file a statement on
jurisdiction by tomorrow the case is dead, and, uh-
President: Who?
Ehrlichman: The Justice Department.
President: They're not going to file.
Ehrlichman: Well, I thought that was your position.
President: Oh, hell.
Ehrlichman: I've been trying to give, I've been trying to give them signals on
this, and, uh, they've been horsing us pretty steadily. Uh, uh, Geneen [President
of ITT]...
President: I don't want to know anything about the case. I don't want to know
about Geneen. I've met him and I don't know-I don't know whether ITT is bad,
good, or indifferent. But there is not going to be any more antitrust actions as
long as I am in this chair ...
Statement of Information: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant to
H.R. Res. 803, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., Book V, pt. 1, at 313-14, reprinted in S. BREYER & R.
STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 154-55 (1979).
Unfortunately, state enforcement authorities and private plaintiffs are playing an ever-increasing
role in the enforcement of the national antitrust policy established by Congress. American Soc'y
of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572-73 & n.10 (1982); see Number
of Private Actions Rises, As Number of Government Suits Falls, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1132, at 412 (Sept. 22, 1983). It is one thing for the Justice Department
and the FTC to exercise their prosecutorial discretion in declining to enforce the antitrust law;
but it is an entirely different and dangerous matter when the executive branch actively seeks
major changes in legal rules that would deny the ability of private plaintiffs to seek redress
for antitrust wrongs before the courts. See Litvak, Government Antitrust Policy: Theory Ver-
sus Practice and the Role of the Antitrust Division, 60 TExAs L. REV. 649 (1982).
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The Court should not minimize the importance of stare decisis, which
"demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." 2 ' In situations
involving statutory construction, the Court has declared that "considerations
of stare decisis weigh heavily." 25' If Congress decides that over thirty-five
years of consistent judicial interpretation of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine is misguided, then it is within Congress's province to change the
law, as it has in other areas of antitrust.252 By analogy, the reasoning im-
plicit in the lack of enforcement argument would probably condemn the ef-
ficacy of environmental programs and civil rights laws whenever one ad-
ministration neglects to enforce these laws vigorously. Moreover, the judiciary
should not be the vehicle for espousing popular economic theory. Thus, the
Court's unequivocal statements present difficult hurdles for those desiring
to repeal the doctrine. In short, the Court should not replace sound legal
reasoning with the ebb and flow of economic ideology.
D. The Inadequacy of Antitrust Alternatives
Various commentators have stated that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine was invented and utilized as a stopgap measure to prohibit essentially
unilateral conduct which does not rise to an attempt to monopolize, or to
the level of monopolization, or to a conspiracy to monopolize which would
be covered by section 2.253 Moreover, they note that other antitrust laws
are available to prohibit anticompetitive conduct.25 ' Thus, some commen-
tators argue that subjecting an intra-enterprise conspiracy to section 1 is both
unnecessary and duplicitous.
Conversely, other commentators follow Justice Reed's admonition2" that
failure to apply the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine will result in a wide
250. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2487
(1983); see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978) (stare decisis promotes evenhanded,
consistent, and predictable application of legal rules).
251. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); see also Patsy v. Board of Regents,
457 U.S. 496, 517 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (to overrule long-held precedent in statutory
interpretation, petitioner must make a strong showing that the court misread statute and history).
252. Compare Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (foreign governments entitled to
treble damages) with Foreign Government Damage Recoveries Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-392,
§ 2, 96 Stat. 1964 (1982) (amending section 4 of the Clayton Act to limit foreign governments
to single damages).
Moreover, it remains the prerogative of Congress to exempt related firms from § 1, just
as it has exempted certain industries from the full reach of the Act. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§
291, 292 (Capper-Volstead Act, agricultural cooperatives); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1013 (McCarran-
Ferguson Act, insurance); 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (newspaper joint operating agreements); 49 U.S.C.
§ 5b (Reed-Bulwinkle Act, rail and motor carrier rate-fixing bureaus); see also Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354-55 (1982) (refusing to exempt fee-for-service
medicine plan by physicians from per se rule against price fixing and leaving open the possibil-
ity for Congress to consider the exception that the Court was "unable to read into the statute").
253. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 22.
254. See Handler & Smart, supra note 7, at 66-72.
255. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 601 (1951) (Reed, J.,
concurring).
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variety of anticompetitive conduct that raises significant antitrust concerns
though it is beyond the scope of section 2.256 Suits brought under section
1 may have strategic and procedural advantages over other forms of anti-
trust relief,2"7 including criminal penalties," 8 treble damages, private actions,
avoidance of market analysis, 2"' and elimination of certain defenses.2"' Fur-
ther, because conspiracies are often difficult to prove and detect, courts allow
proof to be circumstantial and will not toll the statute of limitations until
the conspiracy is abandoned.2"'
The main antitrust alternative suggested by commentators is the Federal
Trade Commission Act's prohibition of "unfair methods of competition"
and "unfair and deceptive acts. '2 62 The major drawback of this statute,
however, is its lack of the powerful deterrents of private actions and treble
damages.263 Because the FTC must bring suit, it is subject to laxity of en-
forcement according to the whims of the executive branch. 64 In addition,
the FTC Act's main forms of relief, cease and desist orders and injunctions,
completely fail to redress the past effects of anticompetitive conduct.26 Fur-
thermore, the Act is riddled with exemptions of entire industries.2 66 Finally,
the federal government's limited time and resources undercut the FTC's ef-
forts to monitor competitive behavior in most private sector markets.2 6
Other prohibitions, such as the substantial diminution of competition
through merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 68 false advertising and
price discrimination under the Robinson Patman Act, 9 and tying agreements
and boycotts under section 3 of the Clayton Act,2"' are too specialized to
provide an adequate substitute for the more comprehensive Sherman Act.
The various defenses and exceptions that exist under these alternatives are
not found in section 1 of the Sherman Act. Overall, the alternatives sug-
gested by the commentators are wholly inadequate.
256. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 108, at 34; see Barndt, supra note 7, at 186-87.
257. See McQuade, supra note 7, at 184-88; Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, supra
note 7, at 373-74.
258. Section 1 violations by individuals can be prosecuted as felonies. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
259. Section 2 cases involve complex searches to define the relevant submarket in which to
gauge market concentration. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945) (engaging in exhaustive analysis of "virgin" and "secondary" aluminum ingot
market in monopolization claim).
260. See McQuade, supra note 7, at 185 n.12.
261. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 342 (1897).
262. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
263. See Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 241, at 254. The FTC Act is not con-
sidered "antitrust law" under § 4 of the Clayton Act; therefore, treble damages are not available.
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 12, 15 (1976).
264. See supra note 249.
265. FTC actions are in the form of injunctive relief, while the Sherman Act provides com-
pensatory relief.
266. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (6) (exempting, inter alia, the airline, trucking, meat, and banking
industries). Sherman Act exemptions are both fewer and more divergent. See supra note 252.
267. See Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 241.
268. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
269. Id. § 13(a).
270. Id. § 14.
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CONCLUSION
Restriction of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is long overdue.
Courts and commentators have grappled with the Supreme Court's language,
upon which the doctrine is based, for over three decades. Unquestionably,
Yellow Cab and its progeny have not succeeded in articulating a workable
doctrine to govern the anticompetitive activities of affiliated corporations.
Nonetheless, the Court should be reluctant to adopt a new standard that
might sanction significant restraints on trade and render section 1 a mere
carcass. Some critics would have the Court do just that by carving out an
exemption to section 1 for related, but separately incorporated, firms.27 ' Ap-
parently, such an exemption would apply to all related firms, regardless of
whether the subsidiary maintains operative independence, was recently ac-
quired, is a sizeable firm in a loosely-knit conglomerate, or has an entirely
different product line in distant markets. 72 Presumably, the Court should
271. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 7; Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note 7.
272. Consider, for example, a multinational conglomerate whose prior history and success
were based primarily on retail merchandising. At present, it operates primarily as a holding
company for four separately incorporated subsidiaries: A, an insurance company; B, a real
estate company; C, a financial investment firm; and D, a retail merchandising firm. Each cor-
poration has an overlapping board of directors yet maintains considerable autonomy and separate
headquarters. Within each subsidiary are other unincorporated divisions and incorporated sub-
sidiaries engaged in businesses similar to those of their immediate parent. While daily activities
of the smaller corporations are directed by their hierarchical parent, the four main subsidiaries
rarely interact except in their long-range strategic planning.
Firm A encounters stiff competition and, as a result, seeks to harm its major competitor
by refusing to deal with any customers who also hold policies with that competitor. Further-
more, Firm A's president contacts C, the financial investment firm. C's president agrees to
release a market newsletter discrediting the competitor's financial solvency; this prompts a sharp
decline in the competitor's stock price and massive policy cancellations.
Firm A also contacts the president of its regional insurance subsidiary, Pacific A Insurance
Corp. Firm A's president, a member of Pacific A's board of directors, tells its subsidiary to
decrease its premium prices uniformly to the level of Firm A in order to compete more effec-
tively. As a result, Firm A's competitor suffers a large decrease in its regional market share.
Firm A's national market share is 207o of all policies held, while Pacific A's market share
in the region is 15%. The harmed competitor brings Sherman Act claims charging conspiracy
to restrain trade and monopolize between Firm A and its president, Firm A and Firm C, and
Firm A and Pacific A.
Based on these rudimentary facts, a few observations are noteworthy. First, market power
does not exist. Thus, the competitor could not utilize § 2. Second, because the president was
acting in the scope of his duties with no apparent personal stake in the outcome of the alleged
conspiracy, the § 1 claim against Firm A and its president would also fail. Third, by combining
its efforts with Firm C, Firm A was able to wield much greater power than would have been
possible if it had acted alone. Moreover, the two main subsidiaries are engaged in entirely
different businesses, each maintaining what appears to be a significant degree of operative in-
dependence from one another, and might, therefore, be viewed as functionally distinct economic
units. Thus, the first prong of the test presented in this Comment is satisfied.
In addition, the related firm's coercive efforts were directed toward restraining the trade
of the competitor-an unrelated outside party. Thus, the second prong of this Comment's test
is satisfied. Thus, it appears that it is appropriate to find a capacity to conspire between Firms
A and C. To exempt Firms A and C from § I would unjustifiably immunize the anticompetitive
actions of two economically distinct entities. Such a result would be oppugnant to the Sherman
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shut its eyes to combinations that seriously restrain or even eliminate the
trade of outside parties, so long as the concerted action does not rise to
an attempt to monopolize or to the level of monopolization.
This approach would be a "subterfuge of form" that would eviscerate
the true purpose of the Sherman Act.273 A more reasonable limitation is
suggested by the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws, and the economic reality theory articulated by
some lower courts. Under this approach, if the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of a case indicate that the affiliated corporations function as
distinct economic units and their concerted efforts are directed toward the
trade of unrelated third parties, a finding of capacity to conspire is ap-
propriate. This standard alleviates the harsh effects of condemning internal
agreements or actions by essentially single enterprise firms. At the same time,
the suggested approach enforces the intent of the Sherman Act, respects stare
decisis, and refuses to disregard significant combinations in restraint of trade.
Kenneth P. Quinn
Act. Finally, Firm A and Pacific A are engaged in similar businesses with control vested primarily
in Firm A. In essence, Pacific A seems to be merely the regional sales arm or corporate alter
ego of Firm A. Also, the agreement between the two firms concerned basic pricing policy that
should be expected beween related firms in the same business, but different markets. Conse-
quently, a finding of incapacity to conspire seems warranted.
It is once again essential to note that a determination of a capacity to conspire is only the
first step to finding a § 1 violation. The court must then proceed to examine the activity resulting
from the conspiracy to determine whether the concerted actions were actually unreasonable;
absent such a finding, § 1 is not violated.
273. The Supreme Court noted that
the first and second sections of the [Sherman Act], when taken together, embraced
every conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of
the prohibitions of the law, without regard to the garb in which such acts were
clothed. . . . [lI]n view of the general language of the statute and public policy
which it manifested, there was no possibility of frustrating that policy by resort
to any disguise or subterfuge of form, since resorting to reason rendered it im-
possible to escape, by any indirection, the prohibitions of the statute.
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
